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Habeas and the Roberts Court
Aziz Z. Huq†
Postconviction habeas comprises about 7 percent of federal district courts’
dockets and between 8 and 20 percent of Supreme Court certiorari work. Scholars
of all stripes condemn habeas as an empty “charade” lacking “coherent form.” They
consequently urge root-and-branch transformation. Resisting that consensus, this
Article first advances a descriptive hypothesis: The Roberts Court’s habeas jurisprudence is more internally coherent than generally believed—even if its internal logic
has to date escaped substantial scholarly scrutiny. That jurisprudence is an instrument for sorting at the front end of litigation between cases warranting either less or
more judicial attention. This account suggests that the Roberts Court titrates judicial attention by streaming cases into one of two channels via a diverse set of procedural and substantive mechanisms. In Track One, petitioners obtain scanty review
and almost never prevail. In Track Two, by contrast, petitions receive more serious
consideration and have a more substantial (if hardly certain) chance of success. This
stylized account of the case law enables more focused investigation of the values that
the Roberts Court pursues through its current articulation of habeas doctrine—and
this is the Article’s second task. Drawing on both doctrinal analysis and law-andeconomics models of litigation, the Article explores several possible justifications for
the Court’s observed bifurcated approach. Rejecting explanations based on state-centered federalism values, sorting, and sentinel effects, the Article suggests that some
conception of fault best fits the role of a central organizing principle. This aligns
habeas with constitutional-tort law, suggesting a previously unexamined degree of
interdoctrinal coherence in the Roberts Court’s attitude to otherwise distinct constitutional remedies. While the central aim of this Article is positive and descriptive in
character, it concludes by examining some normative entailments of habeas’s persistence in a bifurcated state. Specifically, I suggest that a better understanding of the
Court’s fault-based logic casts skeptical light on existing reform proposals, and is at
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least consistent with the possibility that habeas could still serve as a tool in some
larger projects of criminal-justice reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Like a guest lingering when the banquet has ended, postconviction habeas corpus persists as an obdurate and often unwelcome fixture of the federal court docket.1 In the district courts,
1
Federal courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
USC § 2241 and § 2254(a). Postconviction review for federal prisoners occurs under conditions defined primarily in 28 USC § 2255. Prisoners convicted in state court are governed
by rules enunciated in 28 USC § 2254. See Brandon L. Garrett and Lee Kovarsky, Federal
Habeas Corpus: Executive Detention and Post-Conviction Litigation 134 (Foundation
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6.77 percent of cases filed in the year ending September 30, 2012,
sought noncapital postconviction relief.2 At the Supreme Court,
habeas also consumes a surprisingly large share of judicial bandwidth. In October Term (O.T.) 2012, 8 percent of the Court’s merits docket concerned habeas.3 In O.T. 2011, it was 20 percent; in
O.T. 2010, 10 percent.4 This persistence of federal habeas review—even aside from its famously quirky doctrinal contours—is
poorly explained by any obvious functional benefit. To be sure, the
state criminal-justice systems producing most challenged convictions remain deeply riven by serious constitutional flaws.5 Of
these, perhaps the most embarrassing is the states’ persistent
failure to furnish or fund the effective assistance of counsel that
is required by the Sixth Amendment.6 But patterns of federal habeas relief do not obviously reflect a rational response to ongoing
concerns with the state of criminal-justice systems. To the contrary, the Great Writ has been characterized as a cruel “charade”
2013). This Article largely concerns challenges to state criminal convictions under 28 USC
§ 2254, which make up the lion’s share of Supreme Court jurisprudence and which thereby
determine the general trajectory of the doctrine.
2
In the twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2012, a total of 18,851 noncapital habeas petitions were filed with the federal courts; 19,624 petitions were filed in
the twelve months before that. See U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis
of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, during the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30,
2011 and 2012 *1, 3 (Administrative Office of the United States Courts 2012), online at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C02Sep12.pdf
(visited May 21, 2014). In the year ending September 30, 2011, 6.78 percent of cases filed
were habeas petitions. Id.
3
Stat Pack for October Term 2012 *6 (SCOTUSblog June 27, 2013), online at
http://scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT12.pdf
(visited May 21, 2014).
4
Stat Pack for October Term 2011 *6 (SCOTUSblog Sept 25, 2012), online at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack
_OT11_Updated1.pdf (visited May 21, 2014); Stat Pack for October Term 2010 *5 (SCOTUSblog June 28, 2011), online at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads
/2011/06/SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf (visited May 21, 2014).
5
See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 Cal L Rev 1,
16–23 (2010) (documenting structural problems in state criminal-justice systems).
6
This has been documented in a score of reports over the past decade. See, for example, Robert C. Boruchowitz, Malia N. Brink, and Maureen Dimino, Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts *14–17 (National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Apr 2009), online at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf
/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf (visited May 21, 2014); National Right to
Counsel Committee, Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional
Right to Counsel *49–99 (Constitution Project Apr 2009), online at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf (visited May 21, 2014); American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s
Continuing Quest for Equal Justice *7–28 (ABA Dec 2004), online at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def
_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (visited May 21, 2014).
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ending in a vanishingly small chance of relief for petitioners.7 This
is said to be particularly so in noncapital cases, in which the conventional wisdom suggests that “habeas is completely ineffectual.”8 Not for the first time, a wave of commentary argues that
federal postconviction jurisdiction should be either largely abolished9 or radically “modified.”10 Scholars who are sympathetic to
federal habeas’s libertarian ends also characterize the law of postconviction review as “confusing”11 and a “mess.”12 Even some of
habeas’s most dedicated advocates acknowledge intellectual confusion in the doctrine and suggest instead a need to “draw back,
take stock, and set about reconstructing federal habeas corpus in
a sensible, coherent form.”13 If there is a common thread to commentary on the writ, in short, it is that there is no common thread
to the doctrine. The Court, all agree, has made a hash of the law
that only radical surgery can now unravel.
In the half light of this crepuscular skepticism, the retail legal doctrine leaping like showers of sparks from the Supreme
Court’s anvil each year suffers comparative neglect.14 Such ne-

7
Joseph L. Hoffmann and Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, 84 NYU L Rev 791, 816 (2009). Hoffmann and King have also articulated
their argument in book form. See generally Nancy J. King and Joseph L. Hoffmann, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century: Uses, Abuses, and the Future of the Great Writ (Chicago
2011).
8
Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 793 (cited in note 7).
9
See id at 818–23. Their analysis has been powerfully challenged. See, for example,
Eve Brensike Primus, Review, A Crisis in Federal Habeas Law, 110 Mich L Rev 887, 892–
908 (2012) (noting the conceptual incoherence and ineffectualness of reform proposals);
John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 Cornell L Rev 435, 439 (2011) (arguing that
Hoffmann and King’s assessment “underestimates the importance of rectifying cases of
horrendous error and rests on a set of assumptions that we believe do not comport with
the reality of contemporary postconviction litigation”).
10 Primus, 98 Cal L Rev at 26 (cited in note 5).
11 Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas after Pinholster, 53 BC L Rev 953, 959 (2012). See
also Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 Va L Rev 61, 80 (2011) (noting the “poor
drafting” of the habeas statute).
12 Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev at 887 (cited in note 9). See also Larry Yackle,
AEDPA Mea Culpa, 24 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 329, 329 (2012) (invoking “the colossal mess
that federal habeas corpus has become”); Primus, 98 Cal L Rev at 12 (cited in note 5)
(describing habeas as “broken”).
13 Yackle, 24 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) at 333 (cited in note 12).
14 Important exceptions to this trend analyzing specific aspects of doctrine include
Wiseman, 53 BC L Rev at 953–54 (cited in note 11); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the
Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev 85, 98–104 (2012).
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glect is hardly benign when it comes to the blue-collar neighborhood of postconviction remedies.15 Habeas law is largely a product
of the Supreme Court, rather than of Congress.16 In my view, it is
the pedestrian, piecemeal development of judicial doctrine—more
than statutes—that creates, allots, and eliminates opportunities
for habeas relief.17
Of course, judicial authorship of basic doctrinal structures is
no guarantee of coherence: any body of judicially articulated rules
risks reflecting the ebb and flow of evolving coalitions of justices,
and hence is vulnerable to Arrovian cycling.18 And it is no doubt
possible to explain habeas’s labyrinthine, looped sequences of procedural and substantive gateways as evidence that the justices
are ensnared in the doctrinal paradox.19
Nevertheless, a retreat to social-choice-infused cynicism is
unwarranted. The doctrine—at least in its major outlines rather
than its epicycles—may well have more of an internal logic and
structure than is commonly supposed. The justices, at least, seem
to think so. They find coherence in the serried crowd of hobnailed
habeas precedents. That conviction manifests, for instance, in
unanimous decisions, extending into O.T. 2013, in which the
Court, often acting per curiam, reversed habeas decisions (mostly
grants of relief) from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals without
briefing or oral argument.20 That is, the justices’ views about the

15

See Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86 Am Bankr L J 3, 3

(2012).
16 See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 Cornell L Rev 259, 262
(2006) (“While the Court maintains that the scope of the writ is primarily for Congress to
determine, it does not, in my view, really believe that to be true. . . . [It] has assumed a
fair share of the responsibility for determining the scope of habeas review, or how much
habeas is enough.”). There are, of course, important exceptions. The most important of
these is the habeas statute of limitations enacted in 1996. Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, 1217, codified at
28 USC § 2244(d)(1) (creating a one-year statute of limitations).
17 See text accompanying notes 33–44 for further discussion.
18 The Arrovian paradox concerns the instability of collective decisions due to the
irreducible risk of cycling among outcomes. See Frank E. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing
the Court, 95 Harv L Rev 802, 815–17, 823–31 (1982).
19 The doctrinal paradox arises when a collective forms a judgment on a single issue
based on numerous subissues, and different ultimate results are obtained by a single allor-nothing vote versus seriatim issue-by-issue voting over subissues. See Christian List,
The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions, 24 Soc Choice & Welfare 3, 4–5 (2005).
20 See generally, for example, Ryan v Schad, 133 S Ct 2548 (2013) (per curiam); Nevada v Jackson, 133 S Ct 1990 (2013) (per curiam); Marshall v Rodgers, 133 S Ct 1446
(2013) (per curiam); Johnson v Williams, 133 S Ct 1088 (2013); Martel v Clair, 132 S Ct
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contents of the habeas playbook are so propinquitous that they
are able routinely to jettison their own prohibition against treating the writ of certiorari as an exercise in mere error correction.21
Plainly, such comfortable unanimity on so divisive a Court reflects an uncommon consensus on habeas’s normative goals, one
that transcends ideological lines in form if not in substance.
This Article offers an account of the Roberts Court’s habeas
jurisprudence. That description is offered here as a catalyst for
clearer thinking about the postconviction writ’s purpose and justification in the dimmed dusk of Warren Court judicial liberalism.
To that end, I aim to distill from recent case law a concededly
broad-brush synthesis of how judicial labor is organized and allocated in the postconviction context. I do not aim to capture every
detail of a very complex body of law. Caveat lector, therefore: what
follows is far less than a comprehensive, treatise-like account of
the doctrine, but simply an attempt to capture its motive, immanent logic. Of necessity, moreover, my Supreme Court–focused account pays disproportionate attention to those margins of the law
that have received greater attention from the apex tribunal of
late. The Article’s threshold goal, I should further underscore, is
resolutely positive, not normative, in character (although I shall
endeavor to harvest some normative pickings from my account).
A central premise of my account is that federal judges in habeas have developed doctrinal and jurisdictional tools to sort at
the front end of a case between those petitions that warrant either
more or less attention. This sorting is necessarily temporally antecedent to any decision as to whether relief should be granted.
Indeed, front-end sorting is useful precisely because it allows
judges to identify the cases to which they should attend more
closely in terms of the standards of review, the scope of evidentiary consideration, and the availability of any merits consideration at all. To a remarkable degree, the justices have coalesced on
a specific, bifurcated process for triaging postconviction habeas
petitions in this fashion. To describe that process is necessarily to
underscore some elements of the doctrine more than others. Call
this process two-track habeas.

1276 (2012); Greene v Fisher, 132 S Ct 38 (2011). For a rare instance of a per curiam decision in favor of a habeas petitioner, see Porter v McCollum, 130 S Ct 447 (2009) (per curiam).
21 Supreme Court Rule 10 makes clear that error correction is not ordinarily a ground
upon which the Court will grant a petition for a writ of certiorari.
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I thus do not address at length the concept of “fundamental
miscarriage of justice,” which is infrequently involved with success.22 The complex body of law around postconviction habeas’s
statute of limitations also receives short shrift here. In my view,
although this body of case law is often outcome determinative, especially in the complex circumstances of capital litigation, it represents less an emanation of some deeply felt judicial principle
than the Court’s necessary scrimmaging with a poorly drafted
rule encountering a heterogeneous set of external circumstances.
Therefore, in the bulk of what follows, case law concerning the
statute of limitations is crudely assimilated into the procedural
briar patch habeas petitioners must overcome.23 Such simplifications, I submit, are warranted in the service of my ambition of
capturing the elemental movements and motive forces of the postconviction habeas case law generated by the Roberts Court.
The setting forth and then explaining of this immanent dynamic within the case law proceeds in three stages, corresponding
to the Article’s three Parts. Its load-bearing elements, however,
are Parts I and II, which are descriptive and positive in character.
Only in Part III do I entertain some normative entailments—and
then only with due caution. In Part I, I offer a parsimonious account of 28 USC § 2254 jurisdiction.24 My aim in so doing is to
22 See Schlup v Delo, 513 US 298, 326–27 (1995). See also text accompanying notes
55–65 for further discussion.
23 See AEDPA § 101, 110 Stat at 1217, codified at 28 USC § 2244(d).
24 It bears repeating that I do not here focus on the case law created by petitions filed
by federal prisoners pursuant to 28 USC § 2255, even though they add up to “one-third to
one-half of the number of federal habeas petitions.” Garrett and Kovarsky, Federal Habeas
Corpus at 420 (cited in note 1). The overwhelming majority of habeas cases decided by the
Supreme Court are § 2254 cases. Many of these cases effectively produce doctrine for both
§ 2255 and § 2254. Based on my reading of the case law, I find little evidence that § 2255
plays a formative role in the justices’ thinking. As a result, the Court’s conception of and
frameworks for habeas are driven primarily by concerns about federal-state relations rather than concerns internal to the national government. As a result of these considerations, narrowly targeted attention to § 2254 cases alone (which, again, are most of the
Court’s diet) provides an effective and sufficient snapshot of the Court’s larger understanding of the postconviction habeas writ’s function—which is the ultimate goal of my analysis
here.
Nor do I focus on the use of habeas in the national security context, about which I have
written elsewhere. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 Const Commen
385 (2010). See also Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 Duke L J 1415
(2012) (analyzing the choice between Article III and Article I forums in national security
lens using institutional design tools from the political science and complex-systems literatures). One of the surprising aspects of habeas practice, indeed, is the degree of conceptual and doctrinal separation between postconviction habeas and habeas as a challenge to
executive detention. As a former habeas practitioner, my suspicion is that lawyers in both
camps sought to avoid being tarred by association with the other camp.
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show that—contra the weight of commentary—the Roberts Court
has converged upon a coherent approach to habeas review at least
at the molar level and at least for the time being.25 This framework comprises two tracks or channels—hence the two-track
model of habeas26—into which petitions are slotted at a relatively
early stage of litigation (and certainly long before a merits decision).27 For petitions slotted into Track One, relief is well-nigh impossible to secure due to rules limiting the constitutional issues
that can be raised and the evidentiary record that can be considered, not to mention a host of threshold procedural barriers. This
first track covers much of the landscape of postconviction habeas.
By contrast, Track Two is, in numerical terms at least, highly liminal—except at the US Supreme Court. But in a sequence of unusual cases over the past four years, the Roberts Court has carved
out, and then repeatedly affirmed, an alternative pathway to relief for a small class of habeas petitioners able to opt out of Track
One, usually by showing excuse for a procedural default. For
cases that are moved into this second track, procedural barriers
dissolve, constraints on the scope of the evidentiary record relax,
and deference deliquesces. A central question raised by this analysis concerns the precise nature of the sorting mechanism at work
here: What is it that moves a petitioner from the modal Track One
to the exceptional Track Two? I offer some narrow, doctrinal answers in Part I, but this question demands a more sustained theoretical analysis.
Part II thus homes in upon the question of what analytic
framework best explains the Court’s sorting between Track One
and Track Two. I consider a series of potential normative justifications for the Court’s bifurcated approach. My aim in so doing is

25 No doubt, there are many granular details within the doctrine that are currently
unresolved or contested, and I do not mean to suggest otherwise.
26 I use the metaphor of two tracks in a somewhat different way from Joseph L. Hoffmann and William J. Stuntz, Habeas after the Revolution, 1993 S Ct Rev 65, 69. Hoffmann
and Stuntz deploy the metaphor not in a descriptive fashion, but in a normative manner
in order to propose a bifurcation in the treatment of habeas cases depending on whether
innocence is at issue. As I explain in Part II.B, I do not believe that the Court is sorting
cases in order to identify likely innocent petitioners, as Hoffmann and Stuntz suggest that
they should. Further, I should note that I use the term “model” to refer to a cluster of
interlocking doctrinal rules that have a constant net effect on outcomes. My usage of the
term hence differs from the usage of Richard Fallon, who deploys the term to reference
“intellectual constructs, formed by a synthesis of familiar arguments and views.” Richard
H. Fallon Jr, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va L Rev 1141, 1143 n 3 (1988).
27 See generally Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 Mich L Rev 1145 (2009).
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not to defend or vindicate what the Court has done. I do not mean
to suggest that the Court’s two-track model is optimal. Rather, I
more modestly aspire to understand whether there is any analytic
coherence underwriting the Court’s unusual consensus on managing the postconviction docket—to identify the analytic framework, that is, that best predicts what the Court is doing. Chastened as this enterprise might be in scope, its results warrant
attention as a necessary precondition for any more ambitious reformist agenda or enterprise involving postconviction habeas.
After briefly considering and rejecting federalism as an organizing optic, the balance of Part II considers closely three potential analytic foundations of current habeas doctrine. The first
views the two-track model as a sorting device. Bifurcation between habeas petitioners might hence be explained as a strategy
for searching for a hidden quality of habeas petitioners. On this
view, the aim of habeas doctrine is to separate petitions between
the two tracks under conditions in which unsuccessful petitioners
are likely to mimic successful applicants. Drawing on insights
from an economic literature on signaling, I raise doubts about the
Court’s success in fashioning a mechanism that sorts meaningfully between different classes of petitioners.
Second, the two-track model might be glossed as a mechanism to generate needful feedback between state and federal
courts. On the one hand, habeas doctrine must incentivize state
judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel to comply with relevant
constitutional norms. On the other hand, it must avoid overdeterrence or the supposedly costly intergovernmental friction triggered by disregard for the state’s interest in finality.28 At the same
time, habeas doctrine must avoid unintended perverse effects,
such as moral hazard for state actors or for prisoners.29 Exploring
both of these potential feedback mechanisms, which I call the
“moral hazard” and the “sentinel” theories of habeas, I suggest
that feedback-based explanations do not satisfactorily elucidate
existing doctrine.

28 See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 Harv L Rev 441, 452–53 (1963).
29 See Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478, 491–92 (1986) (expressing concern about petitioners “sandbagging” prosecutors).
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A final explanation of two-track habeas looks to the “faultbased standard” that has on one account become “the general liability rule for constitutional torts.”30 Rather than attending to hidden qualities or incentive effects, that is, habeas doctrine allocates relief based on a normative judgment about the degree to
which both the state and its prisoners have complied with relevant legal norms. In Track One, prisoners prevail only by demonstrating an extraordinary measure of fault akin to gross negligence or recklessness on the part of the state. In Track Two,
prisoners prevail by showing an extraordinary degree of faultlessness coupled to a degree of state blameworthiness. Of these three
models, the fault-based model is perhaps the closest fit with existing case law. Moreover, there is striking parallelism between
the way that the Court conceptualizes fault in the constitutionaltort context and the way it organizes its postconviction jurisprudence. In effect, I suggest, the Court has aligned the liability rule
in postconviction doctrine with that employed in other domains of
constitutional remedies.
Part III considers the implications of habeas’s coherence for
reforming agendas proposed in recent scholarship. Clarifying the
justifications for existing doctrine, I suggest, undermines restrictionist reform agendas in particular. In the alternative, I suggest
a more modest role for our current habeas writ, albeit within a
larger enterprise: the difficult effort to reform criminal-justice institutions at a moment of sudden flux and opportunity in public
and political attitudes toward that system. This reformulation of
the writ, while not meet to all appetites, at least provides a direction and purpose to the seemingly endless milling of habeas petitions into dust by the cogs and pistons of the federal judicial system.
I. HABEAS’S TWO TRACKS
A simple bifurcated framework undergirds the postconviction-habeas jurisprudence of the Roberts Court—or so I shall argue in this Part. Habeas, on this view, has two tracks onto which
petitions are triaged. This doctrinal splitting is a device for calibrating how much judicial attention a petition should receive.
Track One captures most petitions that are either adjudicated on the merits in state court or, instead, subject to adequate
30 John C. Jeffries Jr, The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 Va L Rev 207,
209 (2013).
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and independent state bars or, alternatively, federal procedural
constraints. Track One, indeed, can be understood as the summa
of a familiar web of procedural and substantive barriers that dominate much habeas case law and practice. Further, Track One terminates in stringent criteria for relief. Few, if any, of the petitioners who reach this point can hope to obtain a vacatur of their
conviction.
In Track Two, by contrast, there are very few petitions: it is
a residual category into which only the rare petitioner falls, usually as a result of demonstrating cause and prejudice to excuse an
otherwise prohibitory procedural bar. But in Track Two the
thicket of procedural hurdles is thinned and the standard of review is substantially more generous toward petitioners. The expected rate of relief in Track Two is higher than in Track One.
Two important threshold caveats to this account are worth
flagging: First, the model limned below does not explain all of the
doctrine’s complexities. Instead, it aims to capture the basic logic
by which judicial resources are allocated and, as a consequent,
habeas relief is granted or denied. Its focus is also the “law on the
books” (and in particular the law in the US Reports), and not “law
in the trenches.” Compliance by lower courts with the framework
likely varies by judge and circuit, as in most other domains of
law.31 Obviously, a circuit-by-circuit treatment of habeas law
would require volumes—and would be of uncertain use for future
guidance. Because several of the model’s key elements are of relatively recent vintage,32 not all of the framework’s elements can
be observed working out fully in practice. To the extent it is relevant, however, I flag obvious bellwether cases in the federal circuit courts.
Second, my account here is largely preoccupied with precedent, and it has relatively little to say about the statute’s origins
or those cases that merely grapple with the plural and overlapping opacities of the federal postconviction-review statute. Habeas demands a statutory basis, or so claimed Chief Justice John

31 See Blume, Johnson, and Weyble, 96 Cornell L Rev at 452 (cited in note 9) (noting
that “petitioners’ success rates vary enormously by circuit”). There is much work to be
done developing a nuanced account of how habeas jurisprudence modulates between circuits.
32 Two important cases were handed down in May 2013—too recently to have an
observable impact on the courts of appeals. See generally McQuiggin v Perkins, 133 S Ct
1924 (2013); Trevino v Thaler, 133 S Ct 1911 (2013).
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Marshall in dicta in 1807.33 Consistent with the obligation to enact such jurisprudence that Marshall perceived in the Constitution, Congress installed habeas in Section 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act.34 That jurisdictional grant did not, however, permit state
prisoners to challenge their convictions in federal court.35 It was
not until 1867 that Congress expanded the writ’s compass to
reach postconviction review of state convictions.36 But that led to
no immediate change in patterns of case filings or dispositions. It
was not until almost a century later that the Court read that 1867
grant expansively enough to enable meaningful ex post review of
state convictions.37 If nothing else, the pace of this development
underscores the extent of judicial rather than congressional control over the writ’s trajectory. The Court’s eventual acquiescence
to such jurisdiction was taken in the teeth of fierce criticism on
historical grounds from the academy38 but has stuck at least until
now.
The 1867 jurisdictional anchor has been amended numerous
times,39 most recently in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).40 Despite this rich history of legislative action, the text and structure of the habeas statute, which is
centered on 28 USC § 2254, the statutory text, too often does
scanty explanatory work.41 And in many instances Congress
33

See Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swartwout, 8 US (4 Cranch) 75, 94–95 (1807).
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat 73, 81–82. But see Eric M. Freedman, Habeas
Corpus: Rethinking the Great Writ of Liberty 20–38 (NYU 2003) (arguing that Marshall
erred in requiring a statutory basis for a federal court’s exercise of habeas jurisdiction).
35 Appellate writ-of-error review, however, could be obtained in the Supreme Court
under § 25 of the Judiciary Act if a state statute was challenged as “repugnant to the
constitution, treaties or laws of the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25, 1 Stat at
85–87.
36 Act of February 5, 1867 (“Habeas Corpus Act of 1867”), § 1, ch 28, 14 Stat 385,
385–86.
37 Fay v Noia, 372 US 391, 415–16 (1963).
38 See Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal
Historian, 33 U Chi L Rev 31, 35–38 (1965) (criticizing the use of legislative history in Fay
v Noia).
39 See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S Cal L Rev 2331, 2350–76,
2416–23 (1993).
40 Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214.
41 The legislative history of major changes to the habeas statute is notoriously
opaque. The legislative history of the 1867 Act comprised “presentation without written
report . . . without discussion of its purposes in either house other than the explanation
offered by the member reporting it, with its proponent in the Senate ignorant of both its
genesis and of the explanation offered by its draftsman on the floor of the House.” Mayers,
33 U Chi L Rev at 42 (cited in note 38). The legislative history of AEDPA is also ambiguous
and less subject to unidirectional readings than the Court has sometimes suggested. Lee
Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 Tulane L Rev 443, 445
34
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simply codifies post hoc judicial innovations or accepts ideas
floated outside the context of regnant law.42 On other occasions,
the statutory text is so ambiguous, and so generative of circuit
splits, that it might as well have been drafted as a delegation to
the Court. Although notionally interpretations of the habeas statute, and in particular AEDPA, the most important elements of
postconviction habeas jurisprudence limned below are either freestanding judicial creations or statutory texts codifying judicial
ideas. Contra the great Chief Justice, therefore, habeas today is
in large measure not a product of legislative intent, but rather the
product of his own Court.43 Whatever justifications, whatever
downstream effects the two-track model has, in my view they
should be traced back primarily to the Supreme Court, and not to
Congress.44
A.

Track One

Track One captures the modal—indeed all but the marginal—postconviction habeas petitioner. It is characterized by
three barriers to relief: (1) a sequence of procedural bars largely
imagined first by the Court, (2) a standard of review that tips the
scales heavily toward the state, and (3) a chary understanding of
the relevant evidentiary record. As onerous as the Track One path

(2007) (“Given what we know about AEDPA’s legislative history, there is little support for
the argument that courts should interpret AEDPA’s ambiguities with any particular purposes in mind.”). See also Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive
Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 NYU L Rev 699, 705 (2002)
(“AEDPA is replete with ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies [that] are quite obviously the products of the haste with which the statute was drafted and the emotional context in which it was debated and enacted.”) (citation omitted). Efforts to explain habeas
jurisprudence in light of a single congressional intent, accordingly, are futile.
42 Consider, for example, Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia in Wright v West, 505 US 277, 288–95 (1992), which
argued for something less than de novo review of state-court rulings on federal law. Justice
Thomas’s conclusion anticipated the standard articulated in 28 USC § 2254(d)(1).
43 See Freedman, Rethinking the Great Writ at 139 n 21 (cited in note 34) (collecting
authorities for this point). On the supervisory power of the Supreme Court, see McNabb v
United States, 318 US 332, 340 (1943) (asserting such authority).
44 The division of institutional labor in the articulation of habeas jurisdiction, in my
view, warrants more careful theoretical scrutiny than it has to date received. The general
pattern (with some recent exceptions) is that Congress has expanded or consolidated jurisdiction, whereas the Court has propelled jurisdictional retrenchment. Contra the image
of empire-building justices keen on amplifying their suzerainty over a maximum scope of
policy matters, the judiciary seems to have a veritable allergy to habeas jurisdiction. I aim
to explore this dynamic, which I only touch on here, in future work.
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has been, the Court amplified its difficulties in a pair of 2011 decisions.45 Although both decisions attracted partial dissents, in
neither case did the dissent attract four votes. Moreover, neither
decision provoked durable resistance from any member of the
Court. I first present the central trilogy of barriers (procedural,
then evidentiary, then substantive) that regulate the availability
of habeas relief. I next separately examine the Court’s 2011 decisions as a way of underscoring the motifs that consciously underwrite Track One. These two decisions merit highlighting for the
additional reason that they contrast usefully with a sequence of
five contemporaneous decisions handed down from 2010 to 2013
that cement the contours of Track Two.46
1. Procedural barriers.
A plurality of claims in postconviction habeas petitions are
dismissed on procedural grounds applicable prior to merits consideration.47 Most importantly, a claim can be aired in postconviction habeas only if it has been fairly presented to a state court and
thereby “exhausted.”48 Originally a judicially crafted rule,49 exhaustion has had a statutory berth since 1948.50 The statutory
text, though, provides incomplete direction as to how exhaustion
works. Rather, the mechanics of exhaustion have emerged via serial judicial glosses. For instance, the Court has installed a “full”
exhaustion rule such that all claims in a petition must be exhausted before any can be adjudicated in federal court.51 The
Court has also limited petitioners’ opportunities to stay federal

45 See generally Cullen v Pinholster, 131 S Ct 1388 (2011); Harrington v Richter, 131
S Ct 770 (2011).
46 See text accompanying notes 124–42.
47 A 2009 study led by Professor Nancy King concluded that 58 percent of noncapital
habeas cases in a sample of federal court litigation were dismissed entirely on procedural
grounds. See Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II, and Brian J. Ostrom, Final Technical
Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus
Cases Filed by State Prisoners under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 *45 (2007), online at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (visited
May 21, 2014).
48 See, for example, O’Sullivan v Boerckel, 526 US 838, 839 (1999). The state can also
expressly waive its exhaustion defense. 28 USC § 2254(b)(3).
49 See Ex parte Royall, 117 US 241, 251 (1886).
50 28 USC § 2254(b)(1)(A). See also Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 515–16 (1982) (discussing codification history of exhaustion doctrine).
51 Lundy, 455 US at 519–20.
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proceedings so as to return to state court to raise their unexhausted claims.52 Claims not aired adequately in a state tribunal
are dismissed under a nonstatutory procedural-default doctrine.53
In addition to the Scylla and Charybdis of exhaustion and procedural default, there are additional statutory barriers to second or
successive petitions54 and untimely petitions (pursuant to a stringent one-year federal statute of limitations).55
Importantly, this cluster of threshold impediments to merits
consideration is not without exceptions. The exceptions—which I
will take up in more detail when I turn to Track Two—do not alter
fundamentally the modal or median outcome in habeas litigation.
In the case of procedural default, the Court has carved out exceptions when petitioners show “cause and prejudice,” or alternatively present evidence of a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”56 The term “fundamental miscarriage of justice” comprises
those extremely rare instances in which a court is presented with
powerful evidence that a constitutional violation has likely resulted in the conviction of one who is “actually innocent.”57 Obviously, this occurs very infrequently,58 and it cannot be assumed
that the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice rule will play a significant role in practice beyond a marginal set of outlier cases.59

52 See Rhines v Weber, 544 US 269, 277 (2005) (holding that “stay and abeyance is
only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court”). District courts also need not
warn petitioners of the consequences of withdrawing a petition for exhaustion purposes.
See Pliler v Ford, 542 US 225, 231 (2004).
53 See Coleman v Thompson, 501 US 722, 753–54 (1991) (elaborating the proceduraldefault rule).
54 See 28 USC § 2244(b)(1)–(2). The term “second or successive,” however is a “term
of art,” which does not encompass all cases within its literal compass. Magwood v Patterson, 130 S Ct 2788, 2797 (2010), quoting Slack v McDaniel, 529 US 473, 486 (2000). See
also text accompanying notes 119–23 for further discussion of the exceptions.
55 28 USC § 2244(d). In the decade after AEDPA’s enactment, the Court granted review in nine cases involving the statute of limitations, making it one of the primary sources
of doctrinal complexity in postconviction habeas. See Blume, 91 Cornell L Rev at 290 (cited
in note 16).
56 Coleman, 501 US at 753–57.
57 Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478, 495–96 (1986); Schlup, 513 US at 326–27; Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 Cornell L Rev 329, 336–37 (2010) (exploring the history of the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception).
58 This infrequency may be either due to the absence of instances of actual innocence
or alternatively due to the resource constraints on convicted defendants.
59 The fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception, however, may play a significant role in those cases in which there is exculpatory DNA evidence that comes to light
after a conviction becomes final. I am grateful to Professor Garrett for conversation on this
point.
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Cause for a procedural default, by contrast, has been only
loosely defined to require something “external” to a petitioner60
whereas the definition of prejudice has remained somewhat fuzzy
at the edges.61 Violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
count as excusing cause.62 This may not be of much consequence,
for the standard for unconstitutionally ineffective assistance is
pitched exceedingly low. Cause, therefore, does not sweep in quotidian attorney negligence, which may well be pervasive in states’
criminal-adjudicative systems.63 This places extenuating cause
beyond the grasp of most petitioners.64 In consequence, excuses
for procedural defaults—and by analogy excuses for untimeliness
or a successive petition—are scarce, albeit seemingly more common than fundamental miscarriages of justice. They are, though,
the main gateway through which petitioners can step to enter
Track Two. Accordingly, I will assume it is not feasible to make
such an excuse for the purposes of discussing Track One, although
I will pick up on that possibility in the following Sections.
2. Evidentiary and standard-of-review barriers.
Petitioners who thread these procedural gateways are not yet
out of the woods. They still face two additional doctrinal hurdles.
In 2011, the Court substantially transformed both of these hurdles. To understand those changes, it is helpful to keep in mind
the law prior to 2011. I accordingly begin by specifying that status
quo ante. First, the Court has long imposed strict limits to petitioner efforts to expand the evidentiary record upon which relief
might be granted.65 In the decade and a half after AEDPA’s enactment, it was common ground in the courts of appeals that petitioners challenging their state-court convictions on the ground of

60

Carrier, 477 US at 488.
See Randy Hertz and James S. Liebman, 2 Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure § 26.3[c] at 1507–16 (Lexis 6th ed 2011) (citing various formulations of the prejudice test).
62 Carrier, 477 US at 488. See also Coleman, 510 US at 754.
63 For the standard’s canonical formulation, see generally Strickland v Washington,
466 US 668 (1984).
64 See Maples v Thomas, 132 S Ct 912, 922 (2012) (“Negligence on the part of a prisoner’s postconviction attorney does not qualify as ‘cause.’”), quoting Coleman, 510 US at
753.
65 See Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 504 US 1, 7–8 (1992).
61
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a factual error could not expand the record.66 In contrast, petitioners asserting legal error could under limited circumstances seek
to expand the evidentiary record to demonstrate how a state court
went astray.67
Second, AEDPA imposed highly deferential standards of review for both legal and factual error when a state court has
reached the “merits” of a constitutional claim.68 Assuming the
state court reached a merits decision, factual errors are cognizable only if “unreasonable.”69 A merits decision warrants relief on
the basis of legal error if the decision “was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”70 As
first interpreted by the Supreme Court in the 2000 case of Terry
Williams v Taylor,71 this allowed relief only when “the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on
a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently
than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts”
or, alternatively, when the state court “identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”72 At
least as initially specified, this formulation did not constitute categorical deference to state courts’ opinions on constitutional matters.73 Indeed, in Terry Williams itself, the Court rejected a ruling
from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to the effect that “a
state-court judgment is ‘unreasonable’ in the face of federal law
only if all reasonable jurists would agree that the state court was
66 28 USC § 2254(d)(2) (barring relief unless “a [state court] decision . . . was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding”) (emphasis added).
67 Wiseman, 53 BC L Rev at 963 (cited in note 11) (“Lower courts [ ] believed that
they could conduct new fact development when deciding whether a state court decision
was unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law, even if they did not always
choose to allow in new evidence.”).
68 28 USC § 2254(d)(1)–(2). In addition, courts will decline to apply “new rule[s]” in
habeas cases except in exceptional circumstances. Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 307 (1989)
(plurality). Teague, however, rarely bites in noncapital cases, likely because of the stringency of § 2254(d)(1). See King, Cheesman, and Ostrom, Final Technical Report at *49
(cited in note 47) (noting rarity of Teague arguments in noncapital cases since the rule
“may be subsumed under . . . § 2254(d)”).
69 28 USC § 2254(d)(2). See also Wood v Allen, 130 S Ct 841, 848 (2010) (noting circuit
conflict about how the reasonableness rule in § 2254(d)(2) interacts with the presumption
in favor of state-court factual conclusions in § 2254(e)(1), but declining to resolve it).
70 28 USC § 2254(d)(1).
71 529 US 362 (2000).
72 Id at 412–13.
73 See Blume, 91 Cornell L Rev at 276 (cited in note 16).

03 HUQ_ART_FLIP (DO NOT DELETE)

536

The University of Chicago Law Review

6/11/2014 11:09 AM

[81:519

unreasonable,” and granted habeas relief.74 Nevertheless, the
Court’s construction of § 2254(d)(1)’s legal standard in Terry Williams certainly added to the barriers narrowing the way to habeas
relief.75
3. Richter and Pinholster.
All this seems minatory enough. Yet the Court in 2011 issued
two decisions that render the possibility of relief even more remote by calcifying both the evidentiary standard and the standard of legal review, particularly regarding summary opinions.
First, Cullen v Pinholster76 reconfigured habeas practice by holding (contra most circuit precedent) that habeas petitioners are
categorically prohibited from expanding the record when challenging errors of law at least when a claim has been adjudicated
on the merits in state court.77 Pinholster limits the evidentiary
record available to the federal habeas tribunal to that developed
in state court. This record can be especially cramped when an issue, such as ineffective assistance of counsel or a state failure to
produce exculpatory material, can be raised only after an appeal
is complete.78 States rarely provide counsel on state postconviction review and often make it “virtually impossible” to secure an
evidentiary hearing in such proceedings.79 The effect is likely amplified by the frequency of impoverished performances by trial
counsel. Until Pinholster, “[f]actual development through discov-

74 Terry Williams, 529 US at 377 (Stevens) (discussing a standard installed in Green
v French, 143 F3d 865, 870 (4th Cir 1998)).
75 A harmless error threshold also constrains habeas relief, although in practice
rarely seems to bite. See Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 637 (1993) (holding that habeas relief will issue only when an error has “a substantial and injurious effect” on the
jury verdict).
76 131 S Ct 1388 (2011).
77 Id at 1398 (holding that “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that
was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits”). Only Justices Alito
and Sotomayor objected to this ruling. Id at 1411 (Alito concurring); id at 1413–15 (Sotomayor dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined another part of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. Pinholster was anticipated by Schriro v Landrigan, 550 US 465 (2007),
which sharply limited the discretionary authority of district courts to hold evidentiary
hearings. Id at 473–74. But the conventional reading of AEDPA prior to Pinholster was
that it wrought no “dramatic change” on the availability of evidentiary hearings. Larry W.
Yackle, Federal Evidentiary Hearings under the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 6 BU Pub
Int L J 135, 144 (1996).
78 See Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel after Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing
on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 Yale L J 2604, 2609 (2013).
79 Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev at 900 (cited in note 9).
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ery and evidentiary hearings” was therefore a “hallmark” of habeas practice.80 Now, such hearings will never occur pursuant to
the central provision of AEDPA, and only “errors . . . apparent
from the record” will be “redressable under § 2254(d).”81
Pinholster is in addition another noteworthy departure from
the statutory text. The latter contains a pellucid limit on the relevant record in § 2254(d)(2) but, equally clearly, does not contain
a parallel limit in § 2254(d)(1). The Pinholster pivot away from
the statute’s most obvious meaning had a “swift impact,” marked
by a spate of reversals and denials of relief in both the Supreme
Court and the federal courts of appeals.82 Once more, that impact
is most fairly ascribed to the justices, and not to the 1996 Congress that scripted the words that the Court purported to be interpreting. Hence, Pinholster is yet another example of important
habeas policy innovation starting with the Court rather than Congress.83
The second transformative opinion of 2011, Harrington v
Richter,84 addressed two puzzles instigated by the § 2254(d)(1)
standard of review. First many state-court opinions in criminalappeal and postconviction matters are summary in form and provide no legal reasoning.85 Section 2254(d)(1)’s command to examine the reasonableness of such decisions had long divided lower
federal courts.86 Resolving those disputes, Richter held that summary dispositions could be treated as merits judgments for the
purpose of federal habeas review.87 In addition, Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Richter deployed a novel verbal formulation
80

Marceau, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev at 122 n 135 (cited in note 14).
Ryan v Gonzales, 133 S Ct 696, 708 (2013).
82 Wiseman, 53 BC L Rev at 968–71 (cited in note 11). In Greene v Fisher, 132 S Ct
38 (2011), the Court extended Pinholster by holding that the “clearly established” federal
law relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry encompassed only decisions handed down when
the state court ruled, rather than when that ruling became final. Id at 44–45, citing
§ 2254(d)(1). See also Amy Knight Burns, Note, Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive Error in the Analysis of AEDPA, 65 Stan L Rev 203, 228–30 (2013) (analyzing Greene).
83 For further discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 33–45.
84 131 S Ct 770 (2011).
85 “[I]n California, upwards of 97%” of state postconviction litigation ends with a
summary disposition. Matthew Seligman, Note, Harrington’s Wake: Unanswered Questions on AEDPA’s Application to Summary Dispositions, 64 Stan L Rev 469, 471 (2012).
86 See id at 477–79 (discussing case law).
87 See Richter, 131 S Ct at 784–85 (“When a federal claim has been presented to a
state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court
adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”). In Early v Packer, 537 US 3, 8 (2002), the Court anticipated Richter by holding that § 2254(d)(1) required no citation of federal case law by the
state court.
81
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to characterize the posture federal judges should adopt toward
state courts’ merits judgments. In granting relief, Justice Kennedy explained, a federal judge should ensure that “there is no
possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s
decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.”88 In so holding,
the Court implicitly rejected an alternative, and less onerous,
threshold for relief whereby a petitioner would have to repudiate
only the most likely or plausible ground of decision.89 In the context of summary dispositions, the Richter ruling means a federal
court must hypothesize all potential grounds upon which a state
court might have relied—and then deny relief if any one of those
is reasonable.90
Pinholster and Richter deepen the odds against Track One
habeas relief both directly and indirectly. Their direct effect is obvious enough from their verbal formulations. Their indirect effect
arises as follows: One way in which a petitioner could challenge a
summary disposition even after Richter was to invoke extra-record evidence demonstrating that the disposition was unreasonable.91 Yet Pinholster might well preclude this.92 The combined footprint of the two decisions, therefore, may be wider than first
appears because Pinholster compromises the one way petitioners
could meet the Richter standard when faced with a summary order.
Although neither Justice Kennedy nor any other Justice
noted as much, Richter marked an abrupt departure from the central standard of legal review employed in postconviction habeas
88 Richter, 131 S Ct at 786 (adding that only “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system” warrant relief) (citation omitted). It is tolerably clear that Richter has
not displaced the Terry Williams rule with respect to the “contrary to” element of
§ 2254(d)(2). See Metrish v Lancaster, 133 S Ct 1781, 1787 n 2 (2013).
89 See Burns, Note, 65 Stan L Rev at 220–21 (cited in note 82) (providing a rich and
insightful analysis of the possible ways in which unreasoned state-court opinions could
have been treated).
90 “Federal habeas courts defer to state determinations that may in fact never have
been made whenever they find a summary, unexplained rejection of a federal claim to be
sustainable.” Johnson v Williams, 133 S Ct 1088, 1101 (2013) (Scalia concurring).
91 See Seligman, Note, 64 Stan L Rev at 498–99 (cited in note 85) (developing this
argument).
92 Wiseman argues that petitioners can also argue that “a state court’s procedures
are woefully deficient,” making a decision on the merits infeasible. Wiseman, 53 BC L Rev
at 978–81 & n 148 (cited in note 11) (citing post-Pinholster efforts to develop this argument). See also Marceau, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev at 149 (cited in note 14) (“[T]he best reading of Pinholster is that its limitations on federal factual development are, like the deference in (d)(1) more generally, conditioned on a full and fair state process.”). In effect, these
potential responses to Pinholster—which, to be clear, have yet to be tested in the federal
courts’ crucible—would seek to wrench the case into what I call Track Two.
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since 2000. Of note here, Richter’s no-fairminded-jurist standard
tracks precisely the no-reasonable-jurist standard that the Terry
Williams Court had rejected eleven years previously when it repudiated a decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals deploying almost exactly the same verbal formulation.93 What at least
seven Justices found banal in 2011,94 that is, had been repudiated
sharply by six Justices in 2000 as inconsistent with the statutory
text.95
It is too soon to say whether this intellectual shift will make
much difference in the lower court trenches. Habeas denial rates
may be so high already that Richter’s impact will be inframarginal. Nevertheless, there are early signs that at least
lower court judges are heeding Richter’s new verbal formulation.96
For instance, a six-justice majority of the Court has reaffirmed
the “beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement” language
late in the Court’s October 2013 Term in White v. Woodall.97 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia further appeared to rule out
the possibility that a state-court opinion can be deemed sufficiently erroneous to warrant habeas relief simply because it unreasonably fails to extend a given Supreme Court holding.98 Although Woodall purports merely to be an application of settled
law, it is at minimum evidence that the linguistic shift in Richter
has induced a more rigorous principle of habeas rationing.99 It is
further reason to believe, in short, that the purpose of § 2254(d)
now is not the identification of serious errors of law (which may
93

See text accompanying notes 68–75.
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the Richter judgment in a concurrence that is
hardly limpid in its clarity (and Justice Kagan did not participate). 131 S Ct at 793. But
both Justices later endorsed Richter. See Metrish, 133 S Ct at 1786–87 (Ginsburg); Greene,
132 S Ct at 43–44 (unanimous opinion filed by Justice Scalia relying on Richter).
95 Both Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer) and Justice O’Connor’s controlling concurrence (joined by Justice Kennedy) rejected the Fourth Circuit standard. Terry Williams, 529 US at 376–90, 412–13.
96 See, for example, Young v Conway, 715 F3d 79, 96–97 (2d Cir 2013) (Raggi dissenting) (arguing that Richter did change the applicable standard of review). See also
Dorsey v Stephens, 720 F3d 309, 315 (5th Cir 2013) (emphasizing the “fairminded jurists”
language in dismissing a claim).
97 No 12-794, slip op at 4 (S Ct Apr 23, 2014), quoting Richter, 131 S Ct at 784–85.
Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, did not contest the
verbal formulation that Justice Scalia’s majority opinion applied for determining the availability of relief. It instead contested the application of that rule to the facts of the case.
98 Id at 9.
99 Woodall may also install a rule of narrow construction in respect to Supreme Court
holdings. In effect, it may make it less likely than before that such a holding could provide
a basis for habeas relief in the absence of a precise congruence between the facts of the
original case and the facts before the postconviction court.
94
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be quite frequent) as the Terry Williams Court suggested, but
only a tail population of extreme errors (which, by definition, must
be rare).
Moreover, it is instructive to consider the cause of this shift
in doctrinal specification: The State of California’s brief in Richter
did not challenge the Terry Williams formulation. Nor did it seek
its dilution.100 Hence, like Pinholster, Richter not only made a
striking change to habeas practice based on a statutory interpretation of a fifteen-year-old law that had been consistently interpreted otherwise by lower courts—it also did so sua sponte. All
recognize that statutory interpretation rests on some exercise of
judgment, but it beggars belief to attribute the Pinholster and
Richter rules to a Congress that has remained largely idle in respect to postconviction habeas for fifteen years after the law was
enacted.
Instead, the catalyst to alter the law—without briefing, without public deliberation, and almost sotto voce—was instead an
ideologically heterogeneous supermajority of the Court itself. For
neither Pinholster nor Richter prompted even a protesting squeak
from the liberal wing of the Court. To the contrary, liberal justices
either joined the two majority opinions or joined later judgments
employing the Richter standard.101 These cases thus present in
rich distillate the Court’s shared view of the Great Writ—a view
that may evolve over time, but that, as it evolves, secures updated
doctrinal formulation without regard to any infidelity to the preferences of the enacting 1996 Congress.
The net effect of Track One’s procedural, evidentiary, and
standard-of-relief barriers approaches a categorical prohibition
on relief for habeas petitioners. To see why, consider what a habeas petitioner would have to do to secure relief within the strictures of Track One (assuming, again, there is no cause for procedural-default purposes).
To begin with, the petitioner would have to air both the factual and legal predicates of his or her claim in state court without
violating any adequate and independent state-law procedural
constraints. Having timely filed in federal court a petition with
solely exhausted claims, the petitioner would then have to identify and prove up either an unreasonable factual finding—without
100 See generally Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, Harrington v Richter, No 09-587
(US filed May 10, 2010).
101 For subsequent high court invocations of the Richter standard, see, for example,
Jackson, 133 S Ct at 1992; Lancaster, 133 S Ct at 1787.
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being able to introduce contrary extrarecord evidence—or a ruling
on constitutional law that no reasonable jurist could endorse. Finally, the petitioner would have to show a valid claim on the merits notwithstanding habeas’s nonretroactivity and harmless error
rules. In many instances, moreover, the state-court ruling will be
summary in nature, containing no legal reasoning. In such instances, the petitioner will have to imagine all possible grounds
of decision the state court might have conjured—and refute all of
them. Add to this the fact that the petitioner most likely lacks
counsel both in the state postconviction context and the federal
habeas context. It is hardly surprising that habeas relief rates in
this context are vanishingly small.
B.

Track Two

Were Track One the whole story, assessment of postconviction habeas would be a simple matter. The doctrinal framework,
however, contains an avenue that permits petitioners to present
claims for de novo review notwithstanding procedural barriers.
Even as the Court in Pinholster and Richter was narrowing the
strait gate through which the modal habeas petitioner had to
pass, the very same slate of justices handed down a sequence of
five other decisions limning options that kept open this Track Two
alternative for a select handful of prisoners. Like Pinholster and
Richter, these recent cases are poorly explained by appeal to the
bare statutory text or inchoate congressional policy. Rather, they
enact freestanding judicial preferences. Even if Track Two as recently clarified provides no general license to opt out of the strictures binding Track One,102 the Court’s insistent preservation of
this alternative—sometimes in the teeth of the statutory text—
hints at a distinct judicial understanding of habeas that cannot
be reduced to mere hostility to petitioners.
1. Excusing defaults.
The kernel of Track Two lies in the deployment of excuses to
threshold procedural doctrines as a mechanism to avoid (or water
down) downstream evidentiary and standard-of-review barriers.
That is, a petitioner initially confronted by a gateway impediment
102 Professor Nancy King has recently argued that recent decisions will change little
because of inter alia declining prison sentences, plea deals that preclude postconviction
review, the absence of feedback effects, and continued fiscal constraints. See Nancy J.
King, Enforcing Effective Assistance after Martinez, 122 Yale L J 2428, 2449–55 (2013).
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to habeas review, such as procedural default, the statute of limitations, or the rule against second and successive petitions, provides a reason for excusing that barrier. The petitioner is then
entitled to a merits review. But this review will not be executed
under the straitened evidentiary record and standard of review
that regulate Track One if there is no state-court decision on the
merits. Able to supplement the record and not shackled by the
need to demonstrate the unreasonableness of another judge, a petitioner has in expectation a greater chance at (but hardly a guarantee of) relief than a substantially similar litigant in Track One.
It is worth reiterating that as between the two routes petitioners might take to excuse threshold procedural bars, the invocation of cause and prejudice is likely more promising than the
fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice route. It is a “rare case
where—had the jury heard all the conflicting testimony—it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror viewing the record
as a whole would lack reasonable doubt.”103 By contrast, violations
of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
which can excuse procedural default and untimeliness,104 are
likely to arise more frequently. Indeed, even if exiguous in its content, the constitutional right to effective assistance is said to be
one of the “most common” forms of cause invoked.105
Indeed, the Court is conscious of the Sixth Amendment’s
gatekeeping role in habeas doctrine. In a companion case to Richter, Justice Kennedy called for “scrupulous care” in Sixth Amendment analysis because “[a]n ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise
issues not presented at trial [or in pretrial proceedings].”106 The
103

House v Bell, 547 US 518, 554 (2006). See also Schlup, 513 US at 327.
The habeas statute of limitation is a creature of Congress. 28 USC § 2244(d)(1).
The Court, however, has supplemented the statute with an equitable-tolling exception.
Pursuant to that exception, “a [habeas] ‘petitioner’ is ‘entitled to equitable tolling’ only if
he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v Florida, 130
S Ct 2549, 2562 (2010). See also McQuiggin v Perkins, 133 S Ct 1924, 1931 (2013). The
Holland standard refers to “extraordinary” interference, language that aligns it closely
with the cause-and-prejudice standard employed for procedural defaults.
105 Amy Knight Burns, Note, Insurmountable Obstacles: Structural Errors, Procedural Default, and Ineffective Assistance, 64 Stan L Rev 727, 747 (2012). See also Tom
Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 SC L Rev 425, 447 (2011) (“Ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim that is seemingly specifically tailored to the cause
and prejudice test.”).
106 Premo v Moore, 131 S Ct 733, 739–40 (2011) (brackets in original), citing Richter,
131 S Ct at 787–88. As one commentator notes, “ineffective assistance of counsel claims
came to dominate and define federal habeas litigation [and] changed the structure of state
104
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Court’s concern is somewhat overstated. Ineffective assistance is
formally irrelevant to the question whether successive petitions
can be adjudicated because Congress in AEDPA displaced the
Court’s previous cause-and-prejudice regime107 with a narrower
gateway resembling the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice
rule.108 Further, the Court has previously suggested that an ineffective-assistance claim proffered as an excuse must be aired first
in state court.109 There are thus doctrinal limits to the excusing
effect of ineffective assistance, even without judicial recalibration
of the underlying constitutional right.110
What then happens when a petitioner has not raised a claim
in state court and would be blocked by the procedural-default rule
but for the excusing effect of an ineffective-assistance argument?
Such a claim will not have been resolved “on the merits.”111 The
deferential standard of legal review embedded in AEDPA’s central provision accordingly will not apply after a procedural default
has been excused—although the same result will not necessarily
hold if a petitioner succeeds in having a failure to comply with the
statute of limitations excused.112 Nor will the Pinholster limitation
on expansions of the record apply (because there has been no
state-court adjudication on the merits).113 In its place, a far more
forgiving standard for ascertaining when an evidentiary hearing

postconviction rules in reaction to the new prominence of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims at the federal level.” Brandon L. Garrett, Validating the Right to Counsel, 70 Wash
& Lee L Rev 927, 929 (2013).
107 See McCleskey v Zant, 499 US 467, 493 (1991) (holding that the cause-and-prejudice standard applied in the abuse-of-the-writ context).
108 28 USC § 2244(b)(2)(B).
109 See Edwards v Carpenter, 529 US 446, 451–52 (2000); Carrier, 477 US at 489. The
Carpenter rule might undermine the capacity for ineffective assistance to ever serve as
excusing cause. In effect the rule requires petitioners to raise an excusing ineffective-assistance claim in state postconviction proceedings, thereby creating another state-court
ruling (reasoned or not) as a spur to federal court deference. Yet in the sequence of recent
cases discussed in this Part, the Court does not seem to view the absence of exhaustion as
grounds for not employing ineffective assistance as cause. Rather, the Court’s failure to
make more of Carpenter is striking.
110 This is an instance of “remedial equilibration,” in which there is a “symbiotic relationship” between right and remedy. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 Colum L Rev 857, 914 (1999).
111 28 USC § 2254(d). Default rests on an adequate and independent state ground.
The independence prong ensures that a claim found to be defaulted is never “on the merits.”
112 When a petitioner fails to comply with AEDPA’s statute of limitations, and secures
equitable tolling under Holland, 130 S Ct at 2562, the federal court will still be asked to
review a state-court judgment that is potentially “on the merits.”
113 See Pinholster, 131 S Ct at 1401 (noting the possibility).
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is warranted arguably obtains.114 In what superficially seems a
paradox, the habeas petitioner who plays by the rules and presents a claim within the mainstream of Track One is subject to a
less generous regime than one subject to a procedural bar that is
excused. In the context of Track One, the Court has secured the
doctrine against the possibility of de novo review by installing
presumptions first in favor of procedural default115 and then in
favor of inferring the existence of a state-court merits judgment.116
The availability of a Track Two safety valve seems of importance to the justices. Even when congressional intervention
seemingly quashes the possibility of excusing cause, the Court
has found ways to reinstall an escape hatch. Its decisions in this
vein challenge any reading of habeas jurisprudence as merely a
jeremiad against habeas petitioners117 in addition to confirming
once more the jurisprudence’s independence of any constraining
textual anchor.
Consider, for instance, the treatment of Eighth Amendment
claims concerning the capital punishment of an offender who is
incompetent at the time of execution.118 In 1996, AEDPA ousted
the previously applicable cause-and-prejudice regime for excusing
second and successive petitions.119 Taking the section of AEDPA

114 See 28 USC § 2254(e)(2); Michael Williams v Taylor, 529 US 420, 427–29 (2000)
(construing § 2254(e)(2) as a cause-and-prejudice standard with respect to new evidentiary
hearings). One wrinkle merits attention here: In his Pinholster concurrence, Justice Alito
argued that the rule of Schriro v Landrigan, 550 US 465 (2007), would limit the availability of hearings even when Pinholster did not. Pinholster, 131 S Ct at 1411–12 (Alito concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Landrigan, however, confirmed the “basic
rule” that “the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing was generally left to the sound
discretion of district courts.” Landrigan, 550 US at 473. It then imposed limitations keyed
to the limits on discretion contained in § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). Id at 473–74. When the
reasons for these limits on discretion do not obtain, there is no reason to think Landrigan’s
limitation applies.
115 See Coleman, 501 US at 732–33, 737–40 (refusing to apply the presumption from
Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032 (1983), that an ambiguous state-court decision rested on
federal-law grounds).
116 See Richter, 131 S Ct at 784–85.
117 This is not to say that the Court’s jurisprudence is free of value judgments. As in
other areas of the law, Justice Scalia is often willing to make his substantive policy views
known in the course of setting forth notionally neutral legal grounds. Compare Martinez
v Ryan, 132 S Ct 1309, 1322 (2012) (Scalia dissenting) (complaining about the “monotonously standard” claims of ineffective assistance in habeas and venturing sarcastically to
ask “has a duly convicted defendant ever been effectively represented?”), with James S.
Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum L Rev 2030, 2102–10 (2000) (demonstrating how poor lawyering correlates to imposition of the death penalty).
118 See Ford v Wainwright, 477 US 399, 409–10 (1986) (prohibiting such executions).
119 Compare 28 USC § 2244(b)(2)(B), with McCleskey, 499 US at 493.
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at face value would entail a de facto prohibition on the aforementioned strain of Eighth Amendment claims, which could not reliably be raised at the time a first federal habeas petition is typically filed. But the Court has read AEDPA’s seemingly airtight
textual prohibition on second or successive petitions to contain
hidden exceptions.120 It has insisted that “second or successive” is
a “term of art” imbued with elasticity.121 Further, the Court has
declined to treat a later petition containing such an Eighth
Amendment claim concerning execution-related competence as
either second or successive. Whether or not a first petition mentioned the Eighth Amendment issue, petitioners have been allowed to press the competency argument at the time of execution.122 Even absent the perhaps powerful normative tugs on
second-and-successive doctrine from the competence-to-be-executed issue, the Court’s interpretation of that statute has thus
evinced singular unwillingness to remain bound to the plain text
thereof.123 Rather than fidelity to congressional intent, or some
mechanical and unvaried antipathy to habeas petitioners, the
structure of habeas jurisprudence here evinces a commitment to
maintaining some pathway (however narrow) to Track Two.
2. The apotheosis of Track Two.
Such narrow pathways to relief as Track Two contains might
be dismissed as illusory. And one might expect the Court that
handed down Pinholster and Richter to tighten the screws on the
procedural, evidentiary, and substantive barriers to habeas review in Track Two, rendering the latter largely illusory. But in a
sequence of five opinions, the same Court that produced Pinholster and Richter has amplified and confirmed the existence of
Track Two—often by supermajoritarian margins. To be clear, my
argument here is not concerned with the empirical magnitude of

120 For more examples of how congressional intent is not always a powerful predictor
of the direction of subsequent case outcomes, see text accompanying notes 77–101.
121 Magwood, 130 S Ct at 2797, quoting Slack, 529 US at 486.
122 See Panetti v Quarterman, 551 US 930, 947 (2007) (creating an “exception” to the
prohibition in § 2244(b) for second applications raising a claim that would have been unripe in a first application); Stewart v Martinez-Villareal, 523 US 637, 643 (1998) (treating
a second application as part of a first application in which it was premised on a newly
ripened claim that had been dismissed from the first application “as premature”).
123 Another example is an opinion by Justice Thomas—joined by Scalia, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Stevens—that construed § 2244(b) not to prohibit a claim raised in a habeas
petition challenging a resentencing, even though the claim could have been raised in an
earlier petition. See Magwood, 130 S Ct at 2801.
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these decisions’ effects, which is already subject to debate.124 My
argument instead is that these Track Two decisions are evidence
that the Roberts Court has a coherent analytic approach to habeas. Only by accounting for both tracks, in my view, can one comprehensively grasp the Court’s aspirations for the writ.
Three of these five cases illustrate how poor lawyering can
trigger an excuse for noncompliance with a procedural bar. Each
of the three decisions affirms and expands a Track Two alternative to Track One’s exigencies. To begin with, recall that bad defense lawyering provides excusing cause for a procedural default
only if a petitioner has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the
time of the poor attorney performance.125 But the Sixth Amendment applies only through plea bargaining to trial and appeal—
and not, crucially, to postconviction contexts.126 Yet, either by law
or by practice, many states limit direct appeals to legal questions
that can be resolved on the merits, channeling issues that require
factual development to some form of collateral forum.127 In two
recent instances, however, the Court has departed sharply from
the previously ironclad rule that only constitutionally deficient
ineffective assistance counted as exculpatory counsel for the sake
of procedural default.
In the first case, Martinez v Ryan,128 the habeas petition centered on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in Arizona,
which expressly channeled that issue to the postconviction context.129 The petitioner in Martinez had counsel at the state postconviction phase, but this lawyer failed to raise a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claim.130 By a vote of seven to two, the Court
held that such ineffective assistance, while not violating the Constitution, could nonetheless rank as cause excusing a procedural
default in “an initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of
ineffective assistance at trial.”131 By the same seven-two vote, the
124 Compare Primus, 122 Yale L J at 2613–16 (cited in note 78) (arguing for a broad
effect), with King, 122 Yale L J at 2433–35 (cited in note 102) (developing a more skeptical
analysis).
125 See Carrier, 477 US at 488 (1986).
126 See Pennsylvania v Finley, 481 US 551, 555 (1987); Murray v Giarratano, 492 US
1, 10 (1989).
127 See Primus, 122 Yale L J at 2609 (cited in note 78).
128 132 S Ct 1309 (2012).
129 Id at 1314.
130 Id. Martinez also asserted that “he was unaware of the ongoing collateral proceedings and that counsel failed to advise him of the need to file a pro se petition to preserve
his rights.” Id.
131 Id at 1315. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Id at 1321 (Scalia dissenting).
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Court in Maples v Thomas,132 held that cause was present “when
an attorney abandons his client without notice, and thereby occasions [a] default.”133 Unlike Martinez, Maples established no substantially new rule of law.134 It may be the rare mirror image to
the seriatim Ninth Circuit reversals that have characterized recent Supreme Court terms:135 an instance in which the Court feels
that a lower court denial of relief on procedural grounds (here, in
a capital case) cannot go unremarked.
Two years later, Trevino v Thaler136 extended Martinez to jurisdictions such as Texas in which “state law . . . does not on its
face require a defendant initially to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a state collateral review proceeding,” but rather makes it “‘virtually impossible’ for an ineffective
assistance claim to be presented on direct review.”137 When the
“structure, design, and operation” of the state judiciary have the
practical effect of channeling certain claims into a forum in which
the Sixth Amendment does not obtain, Justice Breyer wrote for a
five-member majority in Trevino v Thaler, ineffectual assistance
by a lawyer or by the petitioner can serve as excusing cause for
failure to press a claim in state court138—and thus a gateway to
more amplitudinous evidentiary and legal review in federal
court.139 Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito had been
members of the Martinez majority, but dissented in Trevino on
the ground that Martinez had been a “narrow” holding creating a
132

132 S Ct 912 (2012).
Id at 922.
134 Maples, though, focused on abandonment as the lodestar of the ineffectiveness
analysis, whereas Martinez focused on the quality of attorney performance. See Wendy
Zorana Zupac, Mere Negligence or Abandonment? Evaluating Claims of Attorney Misconduct after Maples v. Thomas, 122 Yale L J 1328, 1357–58 (2013). Maples also applies to a
broader range of claims than Martinez, which may be limited to trial-level ineffective-assistance claims. See Hodges v Colson, 2013 WL 4414811, *9–10 (6th Cir) (declining to apply Martinez to an underlying claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).
135 See note 20 (listing cases).
136 133 S Ct 1911 (2013).
137 Id at 1915.
138 Id at 1921.
139 In addition, the Court has recently extended Sixth Amendment effective-assistance-of-counsel obligations to the plea bargaining context. See Lafler v Cooper, 132 S Ct
1376, 1386 (2012) (holding that the Sixth Amendment can be violated by counsel’s advice
to reject a plea deal if a trial leads to a worse outcome); Missouri v Frye, 132 S Ct 1399,
1408 (2012) (“[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal
offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable
to the accused.”). This raises the intriguing possibility that a state-law adequate and independent bar arising from a plea deal (such as a waiver of collateral review) can be attacked as wanting a foundation in effective counsel.
133
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“sharply defined exception” and hence “a clear choice” for
states.140 The last point, it bears noting, is somewhat difficult to
grasp. As much as Martinez, Trevino presents states with a clear
choice respecting appellate design, albeit with a more pro-petitioner tilt. The Roberts/Alito position instead may rest on the
proposition that whereas states cannot openly choke off initial review of ineffective-assistance claims, they may so do sotto voce.
The final pair of opinions deal with the timeliness rules. I
have to this point given such rules short shrift on the ground that
most of the Court’s jurisprudence on AEDPA’s statute of limitations is the result of a judicial need to resolve the complications
cast up by a poorly drafted provision. The two opinions addressed
here, though, intersect with the larger concern with procedural
probity and effective assistance articulated in Martinez and Trevino, and therefore warrant closer attention.
In the 2010 case of Holland v Florida,141 the Court endorsed
the possibility of extrastatutory equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations.142 Then, in the 2013 case of McQuiggin v Perkins,143 the Court held that a plea of actual innocence can excuse
noncompliance with the federal statute of limitations, even
though Congress had seen fit to include no such ground in its statutory schema for timely filing.144 Through these cases, the Court
mitigated the textual rigor of AEDPA’s statute of limitations
through atextual interpolations. Both open breathing room for
later-developed evidence, vitiating the possibility that a federal
court will be presented with compelling evidence of actual innocence and barred by a finality-promoting procedural rule from accounting for it.
C.

Two-Track Habeas: A Recapitulation

Postconviction habeas has proven easy to caricature as empty
“charade” or as intolerable incursion on state sovereignty. Yet
scrape away the carapace of dueling rhetoric, and a more coherent
doctrinal structure emerges from the fog of discrete outcomes. In
this model, there are two tracks into which habeas petitioners can
be triaged at the inception of litigation. That triaging is a tool for

140
141
142
143
144

Trevino, 133 S Ct at 1922–23 (Roberts dissenting).
130 S Ct 2459 (2010).
See id at 2562.
133 S Ct 1924 (2013).
See id at 1933.
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rationing judicial resources. It operates as a mechanism for determining ex ante the quantum of judicial resources to be allocated
to any given petitioner. The doctrine accordingly winnows a small
number of cases for serious judicial consideration, leaving a large
body to be resolved in what might fairly be termed a summary
fashion.
In this procedural system, the overwhelming majority of petitions remain in the strictures of Track One. This is the Minoan
labyrinth of exhaustion, procedural default, abuse of the writ, and
untimeliness. Here, even petitioners who navigate sharp-elbowed
threshold doctrines are largely laid low by the twin minotaurs of
Pinholster and Richter. If there is an Ariadnean thread unspooling through Track One, it is cruelly evanescent. Track Two,
though, is a way of opting out of the labyrinth entirely—of finding
an exit from procedural and substantive barriers. That exit is formulated through the confirmation (in Martinez and Maples, for
example) and the expansion (in Trevino, for example) of ineffective counsel as a gateway to more plenary review than federal
courts are accustomed to allowing. These two tracks emphatically
coexist: it is, after all, the same Court that decided Pinholster and
Martinez (both seven to two) within the same year.145
I believe that this account of the overall doctrine is superior
to any obvious competitor. Before turning to the question of what
might account for this arrangement in Part II, however, I should
reject an obvious competing account of the doctrine. This alternative explanation would focus on the distinction between capital
and noncapital cases. To see the attraction of this alternative account, consider a 2009 empirical study by Nancy King, Fred
Cheesman, and Brian Ostrom of post-AEDPA cases litigated in
the district courts largely between 2000 and 2005—a study that
identified large, statistically significant differences between capital and noncapital cases.146 The King, Cheesman, and Ostrom
study found that capital petitioners take longer to file cases, are
145 This complex of rules bears a resemblance to Professor Bator’s conception of habeas as a guarantee of a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate a constitutional claim, but
the parallels are not exact. Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 455–56 (cited in note 28). Hence,
Pinholster and Richter in tandem can extinguish federal consideration of a claim even
when there was no plausible opportunity to develop that claim in state court. The Bator
formulation also does not explain the residual form of review in Track One or provide any
traction on the breath of the pathways from Track One into Track Two. Finally, the notion
of a “full and fair opportunity” is elastic enough to allow for a spectrum of doctrinal arrangements. Of necessity, therefore, some further explanatory work must be done to determine how judicial attention and habeas relief are allocated.
146 King, Cheesman, and Ostrom, Final Technical Report at *60 (cited in note 47).
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dismissed as time-barred less frequently than noncapital cases,
receive evidentiary hearings more frequently than noncapital petitioners, are more likely to receive merits review, and (most
strikingly) are thirty-five times more likely to be granted than
cases with no death penalty at stake.147 Underlying these findings
is another striking contrast: whereas all but seven percent of capital petitioners have counsel, only seven percent of noncapital filers benefit from a lawyer’s aid.148
Notwithstanding this powerful observational evidence, there
are several independent reasons for resisting the temptation to
boil down the observed doctrinal structure to a crude capital/noncapital distinction. To begin with, this distinction does not precisely map onto the Supreme Court cases. Some Track Two cases,
such as Martinez, are noncapital in nature. Many Track One
cases are capital in nature. Second, the Court has not verbally
formulated the doctrine in terms of a capital/noncapital distinction. If this distinction indeed was driving the case law, it is hard
to understand why the Court would obscure the font of its motivation. At least in the absence of reason to do otherwise, it seems
unwise to assume that judicial actors lack even a scintilla of sincerity.
Third, the claim that the Court has crafted habeas doctrine
to enable more amplitudinous review in capital cases is at war
with what is known about the Court’s views of that strain of cases.
As Professor Bryan Stevenson has recounted in his fine account
of recent habeas history, justices starting with Lewis Powell have
“inveighed against [ ] manipulation of the system by capital prisoners and their lawyers.”149 Given the justices’ expressed preferences about the capital/noncapital distinction, it is not obvious
why they would now converge upon a doctrinal framework that
treats capital cases with greater diligence and care than might
otherwise be the case.
Finally, the assumption that the capital/noncapital distinction so powerfully evinced in the results of Professor King and her
colleagues drives the formulation of two tracks in habeas might
have matters backward. It may be that the causal arrow runs
from the presence of postconviction counsel, rather than from the
capital nature of a case, to the strikingly different results observed in postconviction death cases.
147
148
149

Id at *63.
Id at *62.
Stevenson, 77 NYU L Rev at 714–15 & n 75 (cited in note 41).
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This point requires some unpacking. The political economy of
capital punishment is notoriously perverse. On the one hand,
trial-level actors have strong incentives to maximize the number
of death sentences produced, and on the other hand there are
“anti-death penalty forces . . . [who] very early on [ ] made a . . .
strategic decision to concentrate their efforts at the post-conviction stages.”150 The result of this lopsided political economy of litigation is a pool of cases that are routinely characterized by both
careless trial lawyering and also high-quality (and amply funded)
postconviction representation. The latter counsel are not only
well positioned to identify errors in state judicial process,151 they
are also skilled repeat players, well equipped to navigate the hairpin bends and doctrinal switchbacks necessary to enter Track
Two.
On this account, it is not that the death penalty is different.
It is rather that capital petitioners (or at least their postconviction counsel) are better positioned to exploit the two-track structure of habeas because of an exogenously determined political
economy of litigation-related resources. That is, they tend to be
poorly represented in state court and effectively represented in
federal postconviction proceedings. The observed distribution of
habeas outcomes is hence not necessarily explained as caused or
motivated by the capital/noncapital distinction. Indeed, the persisting success of capital habeas petitions might well generate
continuing pressure from the conservative wing of the Court to
reform or collapse some aspects of two-track habeas. In summary,
while the Court’s analytic framework is surely informed by the
capital/noncapital distinction, it also stands independent of that
distinction—and can properly be analyzed in such terms.
Yet at the same time, there are also clear and substantial
limits to the two-track model’s predictive and explanatory force.
In particular, it is important here to emphasize that mine is an
account of the Court’s overall approach to the doctrine, rather
than an observational account of what happens on the ground.
Because Supreme Court doctrine is no proxy for empirical patterns in the lower federal courts, I stress once more that this Part
in no fashion substitutes for the admirable empirical work by Professor King and others. Patterns of case law in the apex court are
150

Liebman, 100 Colum L Rev at 2032, 2073 (cited in note 117).
And there are many. See Andrew Gelman, et al, A Broken System: The Persistent
Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J Empirical Legal Stud
209, 213–17 (2004).
151
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salient instead if one believes that it is the justices, and not Congress, that are driving and shaping the general contours of postconviction habeas. The Court’s jurisprudence then reflects the
ideological and normative preferences that are motivating legal
change. It is a distillate of the implicit assumption that acts as a
motor in a discrete case.
There is no reason to think that this distillate precisely reflects lower court practice. To the contrary, habeas doctrine reflects the Court’s effort to signal its preferences over habeas policy
to a dispersed and periodically refractory federal judiciary. That
is, the Supreme Court stands in a principal-agent relationship
with lower federal courts.152 Enunciated doctrine in published
opinions is a channel through which the Court’s instructions flow
to its judicial agents across the country.153 Specific precedent, for
example, might render “control over the appellate courts more effective; or . . . reduce the opportunities those courts might enjoy
for adventurism free of close supervision by the Court; or . . .
shape lower court results to reduce the likelihood of conflicts requiring Court intervention.”154 In each of these enterprises,
though, the Court must necessarily account for the possibility
that “utility maximizing appeals court judges also have their own
policy preferences, which they may seek to follow to the extent
possible.”155 The ensuing doctrine is accordingly “a means . . . to
communicate . . . policy preferences,” albeit one that must be adjusted for the risk of agency slack.156 Hence, we might expect the
ensuing jurisprudence to deemphasize points of convergence
across the federal judicial hierarchy, while underscoring moments of disharmony.

152 Compare Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari
Decisions, 94 Am Polit Sci Rev 101, 103 (2000), with Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal,
and Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of
Supreme Court—Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am J Polit Sci 673 (1994).
153 See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent
and Intrajudicial Communication, 96 Am Polit Sci Rev 755, 757 (2002).
154 Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum L Rev
1093, 1095 (1987). Professor Strauss’s point concerns Supreme Court review of the agencies, but it translates here.
155 Songer, Segal, and Cameron, 38 Am J Polit Sci at 675 (cited in note 152).
156 Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy, 105 Nw U L Rev 535, 536–38 (2011) (describing the role of doctrine in principal-agent
accounts of the judicial hierarchy, but also going on to explore the limitations of such models).
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Given these complex and entangled judicial purposes, it
would be implausible to assert that the existence of Tracks One
and Two translates in some mechanical way into empirical regularities in the lower courts. Nor am I suggesting that the increased frequency of Track Two cases in the Roberts Court corresponds to an uptick in grants of relief below the apex tribunal.157
As commentators have been well aware for many years, securing
habeas relief is akin to passing through a “needle’s eye.”158 The
rise of Track Two might or might not greatly affect the size of the
eye. Instead, the two-track model of habeas I have developed in
this Part should be understood as evidence of the (agency-slack
adjusted) policy preferences of the justices in relation to postconviction habeas policy. The animating architecture of those preferences merits attention on its own terms—as the next Part endeavors to do—and further as a platform from which to assess and
critique the possibilities for habeas reform proposed in the literature.
II. EXPLAINING TWO-TRACK HABEAS
Two-track habeas jurisprudence is a sustained “intellectual
construct” on the part of the justices159 that reflects judicial policy
preferences over the uses and limitations of postconviction review. The aim of this Part is to pick out those ideas and preferences that best “capture, and at the same time [ ] explain and
unify”160 two-track habeas. My aim is to examine and test possible
analytic models that might explain why the Court has adopted
this method of triaging cases. I examine a series of hypotheses
concerning which analytic framework best predicts the Court’s
overall approach. Based on this examination, I then proffer a
judgment about which one most closely fits the case law. To be

157 To the contrary, the increase in petitioner-friendly decisions in the Supreme Court
may be a slightly lagged signal of the absence of charity toward petitioners among lower
court judges, if the Court is operating as a corrective to trends in the courts of appeals and
supplying a modicum of equilibration.
158 Anne M. Voigts, Note, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 Colum L Rev 1103, 1104
(1999).
159 Fallon, 74 Va L Rev at 1143 n 3 (cited in note 26).
160 Id at 1145.
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very clear, my aim is to understand, not defend, the Court.161 Although I do claim to identify which ideological justification best
underwrites two-track habeas, I posit only that this model has
predictive force, not that it is attractive. Accordingly, this Part
should be read as an attempt, modest in scope, to explain the ways
of the justices, not as a vindication of those ways.
One obvious candidate should be ruled out ab initio: twotrack habeas is not, in my view, plausibly described as an exercise
in constitutional interpretation. The consensus view today is that
Congress can licitly withhold all postconviction review of state
convictions, as it did until 1867.162 Some recent scholarship
presses an alternative constitutional pedigree for postconviction
habeas.163 But there is little evidence the Court is likely to accept
such arguments anytime soon.164 Even if Article III, the Suspension Clause, or the Due Process Clause could sustain some mandatory quantum of postconviction habeas review,165 I do not rely
on speculative inferences from ethereal abstractions to justify the
observed doctrine. Rather, this Part seeks to make sense of how
the Court has sized and sliced habeas relief by recourse to more
mundane and less controversial models.166
161 I do defend the Court to the extent that my claim in this Part is that its habeas
jurisprudence is analytically coherent. Whether it is analytically attractive, however, is
another matter entirely.
162 But see Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 Mich L Rev 862, 868 (1994)
(arguing that “the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized this supremacy-ensuring
role of the federal courts such that Congress is obligated to make federal review of state
criminal convictions practically available through federal habeas corpus”).
163 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 Cornell L
Rev 47 (2012); Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 Va L Rev 753
(2013).
164 Indeed, the Court has long failed to cite constitutional concerns even in cases in
which they might be thought to subsist close to the surface. See Jordan Steiker, Habeas
Exceptionalism, 78 Tex L Rev 1703, 1705 (2000) (noting the absence of such discussion in
the Terry Williams opinions).
165 The idea of some mandatory quota of federal court jurisdiction goes back at least
to Martin v Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 327–37 (1816).
166 Social-choice theory suggests that the collective choice of a group decision maker
such as the Court can be prone to cycling. Easterbrook, 95 Harv L Rev at 815–17 (cited in
note 18). The further inference might then be drawn that the two-track model may simply
reflect an arbitrary local equilibrium, and as such bears no sustained analysis. I am not
convinced this is so. For one thing, scholars of social-choice theory emphasize the way in
which agenda-setting mechanisms can suppress cycles by favoring some outcomes over
others. See Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium
and Legislative Choice, 37 Pub Choice 503, 507 (1981). Accordingly, the stability of the
two-track model likely reflects an equilibrium induced by the Court’s certiorari voting
practice and its norms of intracollegial deference.
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My analytic reconstruction begins in seriousness with a rejection of one staple explanation of habeas jurisprudence—federalism. I do not wholly deny that federalism (in the sense of a regard for the regulatory autonomy of states) is an important
concern in habeas jurisprudence. Without obscuring the echoes
that percolate between postconviction habeas and other lines of
federalism jurisprudence, I suggest that federalism interests cannot alone explain the balance struck in the two-track model. Instead, I consider at greater length three alternative, more nuanced accounts, each of which is functionalist: the first is based
on habeas as a sorting mechanism either for innocence or for
grave constitutional error, the second speaks in terms of incentivizing state officials and prisoner-litigants, and the third sounds
in terms of fault concepts drawn from constitutional-tort doctrine.
Ultimately, I suggest that the final, fault-based account of twotrack habeas best fits the doctrinal evidence.
A.

Habeas as a Laboratory for Federalism

Perhaps the most famous sentence in contemporary habeas
jurisprudence is attributed to Justice O’Connor. Writing for the
Court in Coleman v Thompson,167 she began her majority opinion
with a forceful declaratory statement: “This is a case about federalism.”168 Taking Justice O’Connor’s unsubtle hint, federalism—
by which she presumably means a due regard for state-level preferences as against national laws and institutions—might provide
a touchstone for habeas jurisprudence. Consistent with this view,
both liberal and conservative justices tirelessly invoke a concern
about states’ interests in finality and the control of their adjudicatory apparatuses.169 The persistence of this federalism lament
might be strong evidence for construing habeas jurisprudence as
simply another forum in which the Court has worked out the consequences of its distinctive view of federal-state relations. If highprofile cases involving the 2010 federal healthcare legislation170
167

501 US 722 (1991).
Id at 726. For a critical examination of this dictum, see Eric M. Freedman, Federal
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, in James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm, and Charles S.
Lanier, eds, America’s Experiment with Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the Ultimate Penal Sanction 553, 567–68 (Carolina Academic 2d ed
2003).
169 See, for example, Perkins, 133 S Ct at 1932 (Ginsburg) (referring to finality and
comity concerns); Edwards v Carpenter, 529 US 446, 451 (2000) (Scalia).
170 See generally National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct
2566 (2012).
168
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and voting rights measures171 are any guide, the Court consistently views national intervention into regulatory domains of traditional state competence through a skeptical lens.
On this view, the jurisprudential framework of habeas might
simplistically be glossed by noticing that the Court is often asked
to resolve intraconstitutional tensions between the 1787 disposition of federalism and the post–Civil War or post–New Deal settlements. Even when there is a strong textual and originalist basis for cabining the 1787 view of federal-state relations—as there
surely is with the Reconstruction Amendments—the Court persistently prefers the older dispensation. It thus protects the legacy of the original Founders against those who have amended the
Constitution by formal Article V process or otherwise. The diminution of postconviction writ is then just another casualty of the
war of the 1780s against 1860s and 1870s.172
No doubt, federalism concerns gauged in this gauzy fashion
loom large in the habeas canon. To ignore the keening threnody
of comity and finality recited through the Court’s postconviction
jurisprudence would plainly slight a value close to the Court’s collective heart. Nevertheless, there is some reason to think federalism concerns cannot provide a comprehensive lodestar for understanding the operation of two-track habeas.
To begin with, notice that the opening phrase of Justice
O’Connor’s Coleman opinion is announcing an outcome, not an
analytic framework. Federalism values, that is, lie on one side of
the scale—but the other side has not been wholly evacuated. Even
Roberts Court jurisprudence evinces some concern for “the historic importance of federal habeas corpus proceedings as a
method for preventing individuals from being held in custody in
violation of federal law” as a counterweight on the other side of
the scales.173 Doctrinal outcomes in habeas cases are no mechanical function of states’ interests. Rather, they flow from a complex

171

See generally Shelby County, Alabama v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013).
But see Mayers, 33 U Chi L Rev at 52–55 (cited in note 38) (doubting that the 1867
statute was initially understood as a means of implementing the Fourteenth Amendment,
as opposed to preventing the use of debt peonage arrangements as a substitute for slavery). I am not persuaded by Mayers’s historical gloss: He assumes that the 1867 statute
was limited to a particular evil that manifested starkly to the law’s Republican drafters.
But the law itself is written in general terms, and can also plausibly be read to encompass
other noncore cases of unjust imprisonment.
173 Trevino, 133 S Ct at 1916–17. See also Martinez, 132 S Ct at 1315–16; Holland,
130 S Ct at 2562, quoting Slack v McDaniel, 529 US 473, 483 (2000) (recognizing the “vital
role in protecting constitutional rights” that habeas plays).
172
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balancing of finality and constitutional-compliance concerns. Attending solely to one side of the scale yields only incomplete insight because it does not speak to how the scale is calibrated. As
a result, it cannot explain the outcomes in cases such as Martinez,
Holland, or Trevino—all supported by justices with strong priors
in favor of state control such as Justice Kennedy.
Complicating the picture further, pro-state federalism concerns can cut in both directions. In Danforth v Minnesota,174 for
example, the Court held that the strong nonretroactive presumption for federal habeas did not carry over into state court because
“considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts
to grant habeas relief to a broader class of individuals.”175 Despite
having expressed strong preferences for policy decentralization
elsewhere, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy dissented.176 Both the outcome and the distribution of votes in
Danforth suggest that the justices’ votes cannot always be predicted or explained in terms of pure federalism preferences.
Nor is Danforth unique. In other cases, the Court has construed habeas’s statute of limitations to ignore variance in state
law in favor of federal uniformity,177 and even allowed states to
withdraw waived objections to procedural defenses on the ground
that AEDPA’s federalism-related goals overtake the usual presumption of litigant autonomy.178 These outcomes are not well
glossed by a concern with state autonomy.
In any event, it is misleading to assume that the Roberts
Court has applied a consistent preference for decentralization
that impacts each substantive domain in the same way and to the
same extent. To the contrary, even in core battlefields of federalism—such as in the drawing of boundaries around Congress’s
enumerated powers—the Court has expressed heterogeneous and
highly variable federalism-related preferences. It has toggled between deferential and strict scrutiny in assessing congressional
174

552 US 264 (2008).
Id at 279–80. But see Jason Mazzone, Rights and Remedies in State Habeas Proceedings, 74 Albany L Rev 1749, 1765–66 (2011) (suggesting that Danforth might have
little impact).
176 See Danforth, 552 US at 291–92 (Roberts dissenting).
177 See, for example, Gonzalez v Thaler, 132 S Ct 641, 655–56 (2012) (refusing to recognize state-law exceptions to the end of the window for discretionary state–high courts
appeals in applying AEDPA’s statute of limitations).
178 See Day v McDonough, 547 US 198, 208 (2006) (holding that “[t]he considerations
of comity, finality, and the expeditious handling of habeas proceedings that motivated
AEDPA . . . counsel against an excessively rigid or formal approach to [the limitations
defense]”).
175
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work product.179 In the Court’s preemption case law, the federalism boot is often on the other foot. There, it is the liberal justices
who bemoan the demise of decentralization and conservatives
who laud national power.180 Preemption is a particularly potent
counterexample since its case law deals with states’ interests not
wholly dissimilar to those at stake in habeas jurisprudence. In
effect, justices of all stripes treat states’ interest in finality in
criminal cases as sufficiently different from states’ interest in its
rules for assigning liability out of private transactions. Yet the
criminal and tort liability addressed in habeas and preemption
doctrine might arise from the very same transaction and concern
the very same individual. There is no obvious reason the state’s
interest should be assigned polar-opposite valences in the two
lines of cases.
In short, federalism concerns may loom large in habeas jurisprudence, but the justices’ faith in states is a fickle, fluctuating
one. To explain habeas jurisprudence by conjuring federalism is
to beg the question. Moreover, the corpus of recent federalism jurisprudence provides no single measure of appropriate deference
to state-level choices, and no single transsubstantive theory of
federal-state relations, to extend mechanically to the habeas context. Instead, the Court sifts and assigns weights to specific state
interests differently in distinct institutional and doctrinal contexts.181 Resiling mechanically to the rhetoric of federalism, accordingly, is hardly a comprehensive diagnosis of the two-track
model’s origins or analytic foundations. A more precise instrument is needed to locate the cut point between Track One and
Track Two.
B.

Habeas as a Sorting Mechanism

A first possible alternative to federalism is that the two-track
model of habeas is a mechanism to sort among the large pool of
179 See Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U Chi
L Rev 575, 586–611 (2013) (illustrating the use of different standards of review across
federalism jurisprudence).
180 For examples of preemption cases in which liberals defend localism and conservatives defend national power, see generally Mutual Pharmaceutical Co v Bartlett, 133 S Ct
2466 (2013); Egelhoff v Egelhoff, 532 US 141 (2001).
181 See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 1733, 1748–49 (2005) (“The
open-textured nature of the Constitution’s structural commitments calls for judicial implementation through doctrine: There is simply no way to administer our federal system
without developing rules to flesh out the allocation and balance of authority.”).
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habeas filings for a subclass of petitioners. To explore this possibility, I first set forth a basic logic of sorting drawn from economics scholarship. I then ask whether that logic can explain observed
doctrine assuming one of two underlying targets for judicial
search—innocence and serious constitutional error.
1. The logic of sorting.
Habeas petitions are presented to the federal judiciary en
masse. Good petitions are mixed together with bad nonmeritorious petitions. All habeas petitioners seek the same relief, but only
some are entitled to it. Federal judges, however, cannot directly
observe the parameter that determines eligibility for relief. To be
sure, some information appears on the face of a petition. But sorting still presents a challenge since, at least at the filing stage,
meritorious and nonmeritorious petitions are hard to distinguish.
Appearances—that is, the content of petitions—are unreliable because applicants with nonmeritorious petitions have strong incentives to mimic the observable characteristics of meritorious
applicants by parroting the outward aspects of a meritorious
claim.182
To be sure, this assumes some sophistication on habeas petitioners’ part. But it is not implausible to envisage how such narrowly defined sophistication arises. Imagine, for instance, a large
prison population in which one out of every 5,000 petitioners overcomes motions to dismiss and secures a colorable hearing, such
that the balance of potential petitioners need merely mimic that
successful petition. As a result of these dynamics, judges accordingly must seek out a proxy that creates a separating equilibrium,
rather than a pooling equilibrium, between meritorious and nonmeritorious petitions.183
A threshold puzzle embedded in the sorting theory of habeas
is that there is disagreement about the underlying trait that warrants relief. In a famous article, Judge Henry Friendly identified

182 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics,
92 Am Econ Rev 460, 463–64 (2002) (“[T]here are incentives on the part of individuals for
information not to be revealed, for secrecy, or, in modern parlance, for a lack of transparency.”).
183 For the difference between pooling and separating equilibria, see Andreu MasColell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 455–57 (Oxford
1995).
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actual innocence of a crime as the salient parameter.184 Although
the Court has never treated actual innocence—in the sense of not
being the person who committed a charged crime185—as a freestanding ground for relief,186 it is possible that the Court’s complex
menagerie of rules is nonetheless a way of screening indirectly for
innocence given the difficulty of direct screening. Alternatively,
the underlying case characteristic upon which the Court may be
focused might well be the commission of egregious violations of
constitutional criminal procedure that are linked to “extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal-justice system.”187 Although
some commentary might be read to imply that state judicial hostility to constitutional rights no longer exists,188 one might still
explain the two-track-habeas model as an effort to sift out errors
so egregious only hostility (or perhaps inexcusable indifference)
to constitutional norms could have elicited them.189
Whether actual innocence or egregious error is the underlying characteristic of interest, the basic technology for sorting is
invariant across very different contexts. The relevant body of the-

184 See generally Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (1970) (arguing that, subject to exceptions, “convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence”).
185 See Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 NC L Rev 1083, 1085–86 (2011);
Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 Minn L Rev 1629, 1645 (2008) (observing that
“[t]he word ‘innocence’ is used casually in the media and by lawyers, convicts, scholars,
and courts,” and defining “innocent” as “those who did not commit the charged crime”). A
distinct sense of innocence is in play, however, in litigation about capital sentencing, in
which the question is eligibility for the death sentence.
186 See District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v Osborne, 129 S Ct
2308, 2321 (2009) (explaining that whether “actual innocence” exists as a federal right
remains an “open question”); Herrera v Collins, 506 US 390, 404–05 (1993) (explaining
that “actual innocence” has never been held to be an independent constitutional claim).
187 Richter, 131 S Ct at 786 (quotation marks omitted).
188 See Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev at 900 (cited in note 9) (noting that this is an
implication of the Hoffmann and King argument, and responding that “states continue to
systematically prevent criminal defendants from asserting and vindicating their constitutional rights”).
189 Picking up on this possibility, Hoffmann and King suggest that state hostility to
federal rights in the 1950s and 1960s explained and warranted federal habeas intervention in state criminal-justice systems. Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 801–02 (cited
in note 7). As Primus correctly notes, King and Hoffmann supply no reason to focus on a
state’s reasons for persistently disregarding federal rights, while viewing as unproblematic cases in which states systematically impinge on such rights not because of hostility to
federal rights qua federal rights, but for other reasons. Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev
at 900–01 (cited in note 9). I therefore do not mean to suggest that a bad intent would be
necessary to show an egregious constitutional error.
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ory was developed by economists to explain job-market interactions—in which employers face the same problem of creating a
separating equilibrium to distinguish desirable from undesirable
job applicants.190 Like federal habeas courts, employers need a signal that distinguishes “good” from “bad” types. A parameter can
function as a signal in this fashion only if “the cost of the signal
is negatively correlated with the unseen characteristic that is valuable to employers.”191 That is, “[s]ignals reveal type if only the
good types, and not the bad types, can afford to send them, and
everyone knows this.”192 For example, in the employment context
it is cheaper for a more productive employee to obtain education
as a way to signal her worth than it is for an unproductive employee to mimic that signal. The additional marginal cost to unproductive employees makes mimicry too costly and hence not
worthwhile. Analogously, federal habeas courts must identify a
signal that is more costly for nonmeritorious litigants to produce
than meritorious petitioners. The negative correlation between
the cost of signaling and underlying quality makes it inefficient
for the latter to mimic the former.193
The two-track model of habeas would be an effective sorting
device, either for actual innocence or for egregious error, if the
following conditions were satisfied: the two-track model (1) allows
petitioners to signal that a hidden trait in their cases provided
the necessary basis for relief, and at the same time (2) makes it
costly for other petitioners lacking that characteristic to mimic
the same signal.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that there are at least
two sorting mechanisms at work in two-track habeas. First—and
most importantly—doctrine sorts cases between Track One and
Track Two. Cases in Track One are very likely to be decided in
favor of the state with little judicial exertion. Cases in Track Two
are likely to be decided with somewhat more careful consideration
of the facts and law, with a higher rate of vacaturs and remands

190 For an overview, see Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory
100–07 (MIT 2005). See also generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q J Econ 1441 (2000).
191 Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets, 92 Am Econ Rev 434, 437 (2002).
192 Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 19 (Harvard 2000).
193 See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q J Econ 355, 367 (1973) (noting
that a negative correlation of signaling costs and the subject that is signaled, which in
Spence’s study is the productive capability of employees, “is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for signaling to take place”).
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for petitioners at the margin. But second, within Track One there
is yet further sorting between cases dismissed on procedural
grounds and those dismissed on the merits because their constitutional claims do not warrant relief under the strictures of
AEDPA.194
I will focus in what follows on sorting between Track One and
Track Two and then return to sorting within Track One. I will
assume that getting onto Track Two is a precondition of relief.
Consideration of both these sorting effects together suggests that
the best case for explaining habeas as a sorting mechanism may
focus on egregious state-court error as the underlying hidden
characteristic. But even if it is a means for bringing to light egregious error, however, the two-track model of habeas is nevertheless poorly designed. Sorting therefore does a poor job of explaining bifurcated habeas review at least without some further
theoretical elaboration.
2. Sorting between Tracks One and Two in practice.
I begin by asking how a petitioner shifts from Track One to
Track Two—that is, from likely dismissal to possible relief. What
signal, in other words, allows the leap from Track One, which is
the default channel for the majority of habeas petitioners, to
Track Two? Recall that Track Two petitions are subject to a
threshold procedural bar, albeit one that has to be excused under
the cause-and-prejudice standard. Moreover, in the core Track
Two case, there is no state-court adjudication on the merits to
trigger AEDPA deference.195 Typically, this set of conditions will
be satisfied when there is a concatenated failure to press and adjudicate a constitutional claim—that is, a failure of not just trial
counsel and the trial court to successfully demonstrate constitutional error, but also appellate and postconviction counsel and
court.
Concatenated failures can start when a constitutional violation occurs at trial and trial counsel fails to raise or preserve the
issue (such that there is no state-court ruling). Alternatively, they
can begin with the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. This sec-

194 Again, it is worth emphasizing that I am making generalizations here. There are
instances in which lower courts deny relief, and the Supreme Court reverses. See, for example, Rompilla v Beard, 545 US 374 (2005). These do not fit neatly into this scheme.
195 See 28 USC § 2254(d). If there is such a merits determination, the petitioner has
not left Track One.
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ond possibility picks up a nontrivial slice of the federal courts’ habeas docket. Indeed, empirical studies find that a majority of
claims raised on federal habeas review turn in some fashion upon
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.196 (Ineffective assistance is
also the only way to raise a violation of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule on postconviction review197 although it is not
clear that this basis of habeas jurisdiction is especially significant
in numerical terms.) Once a trial-level constitutional error has
occurred, whether based on the Sixth Amendment or otherwise
and gone unnoticed, it is generally the responsibility of appellate
or postconviction counsel to raise the claim and to exhaust it. If a
claim is properly presented at this stage, it will be exhausted and
so teed up for Track One consideration. It is only if there is yet
another increment of ineffective assistance that there might be a
pathway through the procedural-default rule to reach federal
court consideration without the hobbling AEDPA deference most
habeas petitions confront. That is, in most instances, it is a concatenation of errors in state court that switches a case from Track
One to Track Two.
Both Martinez v Ryan198 and Trevino v Thaler199 exemplify
this dynamic of track switching based on concatenated error. In
Martinez, trial counsel failed to challenge a critical piece of evidence, while the appellate attorney, who also served as postconviction counsel, not only failed to raise the ensuing Sixth Amendment issue but also allegedly failed to notify Martinez of the
existence of his collateral proceeding.200 Similarly, in Trevino the
petitioner’s postconviction counsel failed to raise the question
whether the petitioner’s trial counsel had been ineffective by failing to investigate and present mitigating factors in Trevino’s capital-sentencing hearing.201
196 King, Cheesman, and Ostrom, Final Technical Report at *28 (cited in note 47)
(finding that 50.4 percent of noncapital habeas cases contained one ineffective-assistance
claim). See also Victor E. Flango, Habeas Corpus in State and Federal Courts *45–59
(1994), online at http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/criminal/id/0 (visited May 21, 2014); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners to Death: Factual Misrepresentations in Fourth Circuit Capital Cases, 91 Cornell L Rev 1105, 1108 n 5 (2006).
197 Compare Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 US 365, 379–80 (1986) (allowing Sixth
Amendment claim on habeas to challenge failure to object to evidence that should have
been excluded), with Stone v Powell, 428 US 465 (1975) (barring direct litigation of Fourth
Amendment claims on habeas).
198 Martinez, 132 S Ct at 1309.
199 Trevino, 133 S Ct at 1911.
200 Martinez, 132 S Ct at 1313–14.
201 Trevino, 133 S Ct at 1915–16.
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Notice that in both Martinez and Trevino, one can posit a
counterfactual scenario in which the petitioner remained on
Track One simply by raising the underlying constitutional claim
on appeal or in a postconviction forum. Had they done so, and had
they secured a state-court merits adjudication, the petitioners in
those cases would have been channeled directly to a federal court
determination of whether the state-court ruling on the Sixth
Amendment was unreasonable in violation of AEDPA. The federal habeas court would never have had an occasion to ask
whether the quality of counsel in the state postconviction context
was sufficiently poor to qualify as cause for the purpose of excusing a procedural default.
3. Sorting for innocence.
Concatenated error of the sort found in Martinez and Trevino
is not obviously a signal of innocence rather than guilt. Indeed, it
is possible to hypothesize as a threshold matter that concatenated
error involving ineffective counsel will be more common in cases
of actual guilt than in cases of actual innocence. If defense counsel
accurately estimate guilt and innocence, they may exert more effort with clients they believe to be actually innocent than with
clients they believe guilty. On this view, seriatim failures by counsel to invest in defenses might be a rough proxy for underlying
guilt. By contrast, when an actually innocent defendant is
wrongly convicted it will tend ceteris paribus to be despite counsel’s substantial efforts, and hence within Track One’s unforgiving bounds. Hence, Track Two will perversely select for guilty rather than innocent petitioners.
Alternatively, and perhaps more plausibly, state-funded defense counsel may often be so overloaded with cases that they are
unable to engage effectively in any threshold sorting based on
guilt and innocence. Public defenders rarely have the luxury to
engage in extensive (or perhaps any) investigation. Often, their
opportunities to meet with clients are abbreviated. Compounding
the problem is variance in the quality of defense counsel. Many
defenders no doubt work diligently to maximize their aid to clients, but it is surely unrealistic to expect that none of them will
ever slacken in their effort. Hence, it is certainly plausible to expect some poor lawyering, albeit in stochastically selected cases.
As a result, ineffective counsel will likely be randomly distributed
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between innocent and guilty defendants.202 Under these conditions, concatenated error would at best be an underinclusive
proxy and at worst uncorrelated to innocence.
4. Sorting for egregious constitutional error.
What then of the possibility that the Track One/Track Two
sorting has the effect of flagging egregious errors of state-court
process rather than innocence? Superficially, this is not implausible. It is conceivable that there is a correlation between concatenated error on the part of counsel and judges in the state-court
context and the occurrence of especially grave or compelling constitutional error. Moreover, this sorting effect aligns Track Two
with the very small class of cases in which relief is warranted under the stringent definition of unreasonableness articulated in
Richter. Sorting for egregious error, therefore, superficially seems
an attractive account of the jurisprudence.203
Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons to think that
the two-track model does not sort effectually for egregious errors
at the state-court level. First, it is not sufficient for a petitioner to
have suffered from the seriatim failures of counsel and state actors to obtain Track Two relief. The complex procedural skein of
Track Two requires that a federal habeas petition explain how the
state-court judicial hierarchy had been navigated, and then show
that this trajectory matches precisely the strictures of the causeand-prejudice gateway. The petition must also do so while complying with the federal statute of limitations204 and abuse-of-thewrit rules.205 This pirouette will likely defeat many a smart lawyer. It is likely to be beyond the reach of at least a substantial
number of petitioners (even those able to mimic the surface attributes of a previously successful petition).206
For these petitioners, who will often lack counsel at the federal habeas stage, Track Two may often be unreachable given the
epistemic transaction costs of litigation. Put otherwise, it will often be the case that a petitioner will lack particularly diligent or
202 I am grateful to Professors Brandon Garrett and Eric Freedman for helpful conversations on this point.
203 Note that this is not quite the same as encouraging defendants to treat state proceedings as the main event—to do this, it would suffice to abolish habeas without the sort
of distinctions currently drawn in the doctrine.
204 28 USC § 2244(d).
205 28 USC § 2244(b)(1)–(2).
206 For a counterexample, see Holland, 130 S Ct at 2556–57 (2010) (describing an
instance in which petitioner got the law right, and his counsel did not).
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careful counsel at the state-court level and still lack such counsel
at the federal habeas stage—in which case Track Two will be unavailing. It is also worth recalling though, as discussed in Part I,
that there is at least one important class of cases in which poor
lawyering at the state-court level is typically followed by exceedingly good lawyering at the federal habeas level: death-penalty
cases.207
Second, and relatedly, the two-track model is likely to be substantially underinclusive. Petitioners unable to access Track Two
will be subject to a second sorting mechanism, which occurs
within Track One. A substantial number of Track One claims are
never addressed on the merits, but resolved on procedural
grounds such as exhaustion, procedural default, untimeliness, or
successiveness. One study suggests such procedural dispositions
are the fate of a near-majority of all claims filed.208 Among the pool
of largely unrepresented petitioners, the threshold complexity of
procedural rules likely selects those who are less familiar with the
rules for nonmerits disposition.209 Consider, as an example of that
complexity, the rule that for the purposes of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations, the time a petitioner expends appealing a conviction
directly to the US Supreme Court counts, but the time spent appealing on writ of certiorari a denial of collateral relief does not.210
All else being equal, it will be the career criminal, not the firsttime offender, who successfully navigates such rules.211 At least
within Track One, it is possible that the petitioners least able to
navigate the criminal-adjudicatory system and to employ intelligently their criminal-procedural entitlements are also most likely

207

See Liebman, 100 Colum L Rev at 2073 (cited in note 117).
See King, Cheesman, and Ostrom, Final Technical Report at *45 (cited in note 47)
(finding that 48 percent of petitions were dismissed wholly on procedural grounds).
209 See Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 49 Duke L J 947, 961 (2000) (noting that “procedural doctrines distinguish
between defendants differently based on each defendant’s respective ability to navigate
the procedural thicket, which has little or no bearing on that defendant’s substantive entitlement to relief”).
210 Compare Jimenez v Quarterman, 129 S Ct 681, 685–86 (2009) (direct-appeal rule),
with Lawrence v Florida, 549 US 327, 337 (2007) (collateral-review rule).
211 Moreover, conditions in most state prisons tend to pose a “serious threat to inmates’ health and safety.” Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth
Amendment, 84 NYU L Rev 881, 888–89 (2009). Seasoned inmates are more likely to adapt
to such circumstances, and thus can exert more effort toward figuring out the complexities
of federal habeas. Prison is likely to be far more stressful for first-time and new inmates.
As a result of the ensuing mental and physical stress, it is more likely that they will fail
to account for the threshold complexities of federal habeas law.
208
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to be dismissed at the threshold rather than the merits. By contrast, sophisticated, if not necessarily more worthy, petitioners
are likely to have more success threading the procedural maze in
order to reach merits consideration.212 In those cases, the federal
court may still have an opportunity to search for serious legal error—at least until Richter and Pinholster combine over time to
rob even this review of any relief-generating potential. Hence, the
internal mechanisms of Track One are likely to obscure systematically the frequency of petitioners raising egregious errors because those cases in which such errors are most likely to occur are
also least likely to be resolved on the merits.
Finally, notice an odd result that bears on the significance of
the Track One/Track Two distinction: A petitioner representing
himself who diligently raises a constitutional issue in the state
postconviction context may be subject to the relatively hostile regime of AEDPA deference. On the other hand, a petitioner representing himself who has failed to raise the same issue on state
postconviction review—and who can persuade the federal habeas
court to treat his or her failure as excusing cause—secures a more
favorable standard of relief and a more latitudinarian judicial attitude toward the evidentiary record. This raises the following
question: Under what circumstances, after Martinez and Trevino,
can a petitioner who represents himself or herself in state postconviction proceedings plead the inefficacy of defense counsel as
an excuse for failing to raise an issue? Some elements of the
Court’s recent decisions suggest that failures of self-representation can sometimes count as excusing cause.213 But it is not clear
how often this will be the case. Perhaps it is sufficient to say most
failures of self-representation are “insubstantial,” and hence not
enough to open the Track Two gateway.214 However the Court resolves this issue, the salient point here is that the election between Track One and Track Two will often depend on how effective self-representation is judged to be. In this class of cases in
particular, it is not clear how any rational sorting either for egregious error or actual innocence will occur.
These three effects together render the two-track model of
habeas substantially underinclusive as a sorting mechanism for

212 It is hardly implausible to think that some habeas petitioners will be sophisticated.
See, for example, Holland, 130 S Ct at 2549.
213 See Trevino, 133 S Ct at 1918.
214 Martinez, 132 S Ct at 1319.
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identifying instances of egregious state-court error. The separating equilibria produced by the two-track model of habeas, moreover, are also likely to have a distributive effect. For the reasons
canvassed above,215 the pool of cases that do reach merits consideration will largely comprise the most serious alleged offenders
(death penalty cases in Track Two) and savvy serial offenders who
know how to navigate both prison life and the federal habeas
maze. That pool will tend to exclude the vulnerable and novices
to the criminal-justice system.216 Perverse sorting effects of this
kind are nothing alien to American criminal procedure. It has
been argued that the Miranda warnings tend to be exploited by
career criminals and largely fail to aid the innocent, in effect sorting the most vulnerable for police interrogation.217 Similarly, prior
to policing reforms in the 1960s and the rise of professionalism,
urban criminal-justice systems were shot through with corruption, abuse, and extortion—weak points that were most easily exploited by career criminals.218 If habeas is to be condemned for
serving as a stepping stone for the strong and an oubliette for the
weak, therefore, it would not stand alone as a uniquely perverse
aspect of American criminal procedure. Familiarity, however,
should not breed complacency. It might be objectionable to design
a postconviction-review system to favor the sophisticated over the
vulnerable however common such an effect may be across the domain of criminal law and procedure.
Adding to the grounds for concern, the two-track model’s distributive consequences may render habeas politically fragile or
unsustainable. The logic here borrows from an argument made by
Professor Akhil Amar in his work on the Fourth Amendment: The
exclusionary rule of Mapp v Ohio,219 notes Amar, treats guilty de-

215

See text accompanying notes 208–12.
This is not a unique consequence of signaling in the habeas context. For an account
of how separating equilibria in the very difficult context of privacy law can have distributive effects, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126
Harv L Rev 2010, 2032 (2013).
217 See David Simon, Homicide: A Year on the Killing Streets 210 (Ivy 1991) (“Repetition and familiarity with the process soon place the professionals beyond the reach of a
police interrogation.”). For the leading study on this topic, see Richard A. Leo, The Impact
of Miranda Revisited, 86 J Crim L & Criminol 621, 655 (1996) (explaining that Fifth
Amendment rights are most likely to be invoked by suspects who are repeat players in the
criminal-justice system).
218 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Review, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 Mich L Rev 1045, 1053 (2013).
219 367 US 643 (1961) (incorporating the exclusionary rule against the states).
216
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fendants as “a surrogate for the larger public interest in restraining the government.”220 It also directs judicial relief away from the
actually innocent whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated.
In the long term, Amar argues, this corrodes support for the underlying right.221
Substantially the same effect might be observed emanating
from the two-track model: by assigning relief to the sophisticated,
and by failing to select for the vulnerable, habeas appears to be—
and indeed perhaps is—a device for rewarding the cunning criminal at great expense to the public fisc, while leaving the vulnerable behind bars. To be sure, resentment at habeas as an instrument deployed by capital defendants is nothing new.222 But the
two-track model of habeas may be organized in such a way as to
confirm and even amplify such negative sentiments. Over time,
the operation of two-track habeas thus undermines the political
support necessary to maintain its successful operation.
***
It is at least possible to fit the two-track model of habeas to
the project of sorting for egregious state-court error, if not for actual innocence. But such a defense is fragile. The two-track model
is substantially underinclusive as a sorting mechanism. Instead,
it will have perverse and likely undesirable distributive consequences. Sorting theory thus fails to supply a satisfactory explanation for the jurisprudence—at least if one assumes that the justices are even partially successful in promoting their normative
and policy goals through doctrinal articulations. To understand
what the Supreme Court is doing, therefore, we must look elsewhere.

220

Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 757, 796

(1994).
221 See id at 799 (“In the popular mind, the Amendment has lost its luster and become
associated with grinning criminals getting off on crummy technicalities. When rapists are
freed, the people are less secure in their houses and persons—and they lose respect for the
Fourth Amendment.”) (citation omitted).
222 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Selling a Quick Fix for Boot Hill: The Myth of Justice
Delayed in Death Cases, in Austin Sarat, ed, The Killing State: Capital Punishment in
Law, Politics, and Culture 148, 165–69 (Oxford 1999) (explaining how some justices depended on a conception of the capital-defense bar as “a tiny but immensely powerful cabal
of schemers” that manipulates the system to prevent the orderly implementation of lawful
sentences of death).
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Habeas as Feedback Mechanism

A second potential explanation of two-track habeas focuses
on the incentives it fosters for judges, prosecutors, and petitioners
in the state trial, appeals, and postconviction contexts. Federal
court review, on this view, is warranted not simply because it will
intercept a substantial number of constitutional errors,223 but because it will change the behavior of participants in the state-court
system in ways that deter future constitutional violations. That
is, judges, prosecutors, and petitioners will anticipate the availability of federal habeas relief, and rationally change their behavior to account for it in socially desirable ways.
To determine whether the two-track model of habeas can be
explained in these incentive-based terms, it is helpful to ask first
what sort of feedback mechanism might connect state and federal
judicial processes. This threshold inquiry turns out to be more
complex and contested than might first appear. I accordingly
begin my analysis by setting forth two possible accounts of a feedback mechanism linking state-court criminal adjudications and
federal postconviction review. While empirical testing of these accounts is beyond my mandate here, I suggest which seems to me
most likely to hold, and then assess its consequences for the twotrack model.
1. A moral hazard theory of habeas.
Postconviction habeas is characterized by some of its supporters as a safety net to minimize the net rate of uncorrected constitutional error in state criminal adjudication.224 It is well-known,
223 Early debates on post–Brown v Allen habeas focused on the value of this errorcorrection function. Compare Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 454 (cited in note 28), arguing that

if one set of institutions has been granted the task of finding the facts and applying the law and does so in a manner rationally adapted to the task, in the
absence of institutional or functional reasons to the contrary we should accept a
presumption against mere repetition of the process on the alleged ground that,
after all, error could have occurred,
with Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 Yale L J 1035, 1045 (1977) (arguing that jurisdictional redundancy “fosters greater certainty that constitutional rights will not be erroneously denied”). The argument from incentives errors, however, is more subtle than the argument from error correction because it accounts for the possibility of dynamic interaction between state and
federal judiciaries. Professors Cover and Aleinikoff vaguely allude to this possibility by
praising the “dialogue” between state and federal courts initiated by habeas. Id at 1052–
54. They fail, however, to define with any precision the social welfare effects of this dialogue.
224 See, for example, Cover and Aleinikoff, 86 Yale L J at 1045–46 (cited in note 223).
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however, that insurance often has unintended moral hazard effects.225 Just as insurance against loss tends to reduce incentives
to prevent or minimize the cost of loss, so too insurance in the
form of the federal exercise of postconviction review may tend to
reduce the precautionary care that state-court judges take anticipating and mitigating deviations from constitutional desiderata.226 A theory of habeas as safety net, therefore, must account
for the possibility of moral hazard in order to allocate habeas relief in ways that do not yield ex ante incentives for state courts to
underinvest. I therefore start my examination of feedback-based
explanations by considering whether a theory of moral hazard
might explain the two-track model.
A moral hazard theory of postconviction review requires at
least three empirical predicates to hold in order to work. First,
the theory assumes that state judges, in the absence of federal
judicial supervision, would tend to conform to constitutional criminal-procedure rules. Constitutional violations, that is, must be a
“consequence” that counts in state judges’ welfare function.227 If
the rate of constitutional violations is not of material consequence
to state judges, then no moral hazard effect will occur. Second, the
theory requires that judges be adequately positioned to take precautions against a risk materializing.228 Finally, moral hazard arguments assume that the insured actor will respond to the provision of insurance by lowering the level of care exercised.229 If all
these elements hold and moral hazard is substantial, then habeas
relief would best be allocated so as to maximize error correction

225 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public
Policy 14 (Yale 1986) (“Moral hazard is the [ ] tendency of an insured to underallocate to
loss prevention after purchasing insurance.”).
226 State-court trial judges may be better positioned to take precautions—and hence
would be subject to ex ante moral hazard—whereas state appeals and postconviction
judges would be able to mitigate, and hence would be subject to ex post moral hazard. See
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L J 1521,
1547 (1987) (developing the ex ante/ex post moral hazard distinction).
227 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral
Hazard, 8 Geneva Papers on Risk & Ins 4, 6 (1983) (“[T]he more and better insurance that
is provided against some contingency, the less incentive individuals have to avoid the insured event, because the less they bear the full consequences of their actions.”).
228 See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex L Rev 237, 279 (1996)
(“If the people exposed to the insurance incentive are not in control of the behavior that
matters, then reducing the insurance incentive will impose a cost on those people while
providing little benefit in the way of reduced accidents.”).
229 See id at 285–86 (noting that this does not occur with workers’ compensation
schemes).
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without producing an aggregate higher rate of error at the statecourt stage.
A variant on the moral hazard argument was tendered by
Professor Paul Bator, who opined that “nothing [is] more subversive of a judge’s sense of responsibility . . . than an indiscriminate
acceptance of the notion that all the shots will always be called by
someone else.”230 I do not rely on Bator’s psychologicalized account
of moral hazard here for two reasons. First, Bator provided no
evidence of demoralization effects among state-court judges. Nor
did he explain why he pressed that hypothesis, rather than the
contrary, perhaps equally plausible, hypothesis that those judges
would instead be grateful for the implicit reduction in their workload. Accordingly, his argument appears to rest on an unjustified
election between two opposing, equally unsupported possibilities.
Second, Bator did not explain why state-court judges differ from
other agents in judicial hierarchies (for example, magistrate
judges, bankruptcy judges, federal district court judges, and federal law clerks) whose work is equally subject to revision. If Bator’s argument held true, demoralization would be a widely observed effect of hierarchical control mechanisms. Because there is
little evidence this is so there is even less cause to credit Bator’s
naked and unsupported hypothesis.
Setting aside Bator’s unreliable iteration of the argument,
the moral hazard theory of postconviction review initially seems
a promising candidate for explaining the two-track structure of
current doctrine. To begin with, the Supreme Court commonly
justifies new restraints on habeas review by conjuring a “comity”
value in threshold state-court determination of constitutional
questions.231 Demanding initial review in a state court would
make little sense if the Court believed state courts did not prefer
230

Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 451 (cited in note 28).
See, for example, O’Sullivan v Boerckel, 526 US 838, 844–45 (1999); Rose v Lundy,
455 US 509, 515–16 (1982). The Court often justifies comity concerns by citing the need
for reducing “friction” between state and federal judiciaries. Boerckel, 526 US at 844–45.
It is not clear what the Court means by this. It does not obviously make sense to talk of
“friction between courts” in the same way as “friction between nations” is a meaningful
concept. Unlike governments, courts do not stand in relations of amity or enmity toward
each other—or at least not in common parlance. Moreover, the idea that federal courts are
hierarchically superior to state courts with respect to federal law has been intricated into
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction since Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) at 304. Consider
also the possibility of removal from state court and the common use of stays in bankruptcy
litigation to freeze state-court proceedings. Given this extensive range of judicial contact
points, it is not at all clear why the Court should single out habeas as a unique source of
intergovernmental friction in the judicial context.
231
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compliance with federal constitutional norms.232 Further, recall
that Track Two selects for closer scrutiny those cases in which
there has been concatenated error of some sort.233 Typically, although not inevitably, this involves the serial failure of effective
defense representation, which will obviate the possibility of a
state court passing on a constitutional issue. Hence, Track Two’s
intensification of federal court consideration likely correlates
with the incidence of cases in which a state court has had no effective chance to rule on a constitutional question—that is, cases
in which there is no potential for moral hazard.234 If the Court is
selecting these cases for more intensive review, then it is picking
out precisely those proceedings in which the moral hazard feedback effect will be the slightest. Stated otherwise, the Track
One/Track Two distinction might be a way to provide some federal
relief for constitutional claims, but only when doing so catalyzes
no deleterious moral hazard effect.
In other respects, however, the specific workings of Track
One can be aligned with a moral hazard theory of habeas only
with some awkwardness. At least in regard to petitioners able to
navigate habeas’s procedural shoals, courts within Track One allot relief only to egregious deviations from constitutional norms
known to state courts.235 This is not an effective strategy to
dampen moral hazard, even if it is effective way to secure a deterrent effect.236
Consider a somewhat mundane analogy to illuminate this
point: To mitigate moral hazard ordinarily, an insurer will typically demand that an insured exercise some minimal level of care
(for example, the use of a fire alarm or an antitheft device on a
car) and will not pay when the insured fails to take such threshold

232 Indeed, for at least two decades, “[t]he Court has been saying . . . that state courts
are to be trusted with claims of constitutional right.” Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris,
45 Vand L Rev 797, 818 (1992).
233 See text accompanying notes 196–98.
234 Why not remand to state court for further review even in Track Two cases? See
Rhines v Weber, 544 US 269, 275–77 (2005) (recognizing district court authority to issue
stays to allow petitioners to return to state court “in limited circumstances”). A partial,
but rather unsatisfactory, answer is that after so much litigation, the remand may be an
“unwelcome burden” on state courts. Boerckel, 526 US at 847. If moral hazard indeed explained habeas jurisprudence, a Rhines stay might be the optimal tool in all cases.
235 See text accompanying notes 65–67.
236 See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis,
23 J Legal Stud 307, 309 (1994) (“[G]reater accuracy is valuable [as a deterrent] only to
the extent it involves dimensions about which individuals are informed at the time they
act.”).
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precautions.237 The insurer does not, however, require the owner
to take very costly prophylactic measures (for example, never taking a vehicle from a locked garage) in order to warrant a payout.
Moral hazard, that is, is mitigated by making the exercise of some
care a precondition to insurance. If the organizing principle of habeas doctrine were the minimization of moral hazard, then federal courts would not step in when state courts failed to take any
care at all (in other words, when they invested in an inefficiently
low level of precautions). By contrast, they would step in to provide a safety net when a state court has taken reasonable precautions, but an erroneous outcome has nonetheless slipped through
the net.
This is basically the inverse of the current habeas regime. At
present, federal courts provide “insurance” (in other words, they
correct errors of constitutional dimension) when a state court has
made an unreasonable mistake, but not when the error is a reasonable one.238 If the organizing principle of two-track habeas
were the mitigation of moral hazard, federal judges would be obligated to behave in roughly the opposite fashion: habeas relief
should be unavailable when constitutional errors were obvious
and easily avoided, but readily available only when such errors
could be mitigated by exerting an extremely high degree of care.
Paradoxically, therefore, Track One seems designed to invite, not
dampen, moral hazard at least along this dimension.
Even aside from this problem (which is internal to Track
One), there is some reason to be skeptical that the moral hazard
theory can explain the distinction between Track One and Track
Two. None of the three empirical predicates of moral hazard theory is obviously true. Without an exceptional feat of analytic fiat,
therefore, the two-track model cannot be justified as empirically
warranted. The first factual predicate of a moral hazard theory—
that state judges value constitutional entitlements as opposed to,
say, populist retributivist goals—is in tension with available empirical evidence. Eighty-nine percent of state judges face voters in
some form of election, whether for appointment or retention.239

237 See Baker, 75 Tex L Rev at 280–81 (cited in note 228) (“Insurance is often conditioned on ‘care.’ . . . Examples include requirements for anti-theft devices, smoke alarms,
and sprinkler systems.”).
238 See 28 USC § 2254(d)(1).
239 Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 Georgetown L
J 1077, 1105 (2007).
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Most empirical studies show that these judges are strongly influenced by factors other than legal norms in criminal cases. Elections have statistically significant influence on sentencing generally and on capital cases in particular. Elected judges tend to
impose higher sentences before retention votes.240 Judicial elections, whether partisan or nonpartisan, “are affected by candidate- and issue-based forces.”241 Anecdotal evidence of state courts
yields an equally glum picture of incompetence compounded with
animus.242 In the capital context, studies find a strong link between ambient public support for capital punishment and the
likelihood of a capital sentence.243
To be clear, this evidence does not show that state judges will
systematically or persistently disregard constitutional norms, but
it suggests they are highly alert to public demands for punitive
action, which are likely in some tension with constitutional rules.
This evidence hence raises the question whether the downstream
prospect of federal habeas review can be assumed to suppress
compliance with those norms. If elected judges anticipate elective
discipline by a public with punitive preferences, they may already
be relatively indifferent to the rate of constitutional compliance
at the margin. The prospect of downstream habeas relief may
have little suppressive effect. At a minimum, it seems hasty to
structure postconviction review around the prospect of moral hazard when the magnitude of feedback effects might be trivial.
240 See Gregory A. Huber and Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 Am J Polit Sci 247, 261 (2004); Sanford C. Gordon
and Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2
Q J Polit Sci 107, 133 (2007).
241 Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the
Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 Am Polit Sci Rev 315, 326 (2001). See also Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 Duke L J 623, 629 (2009) (finding that
“unlike judges facing retention decisions, judges who do not need to appeal to voters shape
their rulings to voters’ preferences less. For example, voters’ politics has little effect on the
rulings of judges with permanent tenure or who plan to retire before the next election”);
Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace, Justices’ Responses to Case Facts: An Interactive
Model, 24 Am Polit Q 237, 255 (1996) (finding that “judicial decisions intrinsically are
political”). One study not specific to the criminal law context finds no evidence of judicial
responses to political pressure. See Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner,
Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather Than
Appointed Judiciary, 26 J L, Econ & Org 290, 326–28 (2008).
242 See, for example, William Glaberson, How a Reviled Court System Has Outlasted
Many Critics, NY Times A1 (Sept 27, 2006) (discussing the “long trail of injustices and
mangled rulings” associated with one local court system); William Glaberson, In Tiny
Courts of New York, Abuses of Law and Power, NY Times A1 (Sept 25, 2006).
243 See, for example, Paul Brace and Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death
Penalty, and the Practice of Electing Judges, 52 Am J Polit Sci 360, 370 (2008).
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Respecting the second and third predicates of moral hazard
theory, state judges’ capacity to take precautions in response to
federal habeas rulings may be highly constrained. Of course, trial
and appellate judges can vary in their attentiveness to constitutional claims, and may be more or less willing to take note sua
sponte of transgressions by the government.244 But the state judiciary’s capacity to mitigate systemic constitutional violations may
be limited such that a feedback effect from federal habeas cannot
be assumed.
To perceive the limits of judicial precautions, consider the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that comprise a large share
of federal habeas actions. Commentators have identified “rampant underfunding of noncapital defense” as a barrier to general
vindication of Sixth Amendment rights.245 Publicly funded defense lawyers are not only poorly compensated246 but also lack resources to conduct adequate investigations247 and often labor under astonishing caseloads.248 State-court judges may be able to
respond to the most extreme cases of ineffective assistance by appointing new counsel. But they are poorly situated to respond to
endemic underfunding that underwrites many violations of the
Sixth Amendment currently.249 Unlike state judges, state legislators who do control funding levels are unlikely to be vulnerable to
moral hazard from federal habeas.250

244 State judges cannot obviously diminish care with respect to hidden violations, such
as violations of Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963).
245 Benjamin H. Barton and Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U Pa L Rev 967, 974 (2012). See generally Karen Houppert, Chasing Gideon: The Elusive Quest for Poor People’s Justice (New Press 2013).
246 See Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 Mo L Rev 907, 912–13
(2010). The situation in capital cases is no better. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide
Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63
Vand L Rev 307, 323–26 (2010).
247 See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U Ill L Rev 53, 76–77 & n 158 (noting underfunding of expert assistance for indigent defendants).
248 See Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev at 895 (cited in note 9).
249 Efforts to obtain injunctions under state constitutions requiring better indigentdefense funding have generally failed. See, for example, Quitman County v State, 910 S2d
1032, 1048 (Miss 2005); State v Peart, 621 S2d 780, 785–92 (La 1993).
250 Generalizations here—as in much of this analysis—are hazardous. In New York
State, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman has been instrumental in securing increased defense funding. See Law Day Remarks by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman (NY Courts May
1, 2013), online at http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/lawday13trans.pdf (visited May 21,
2014). It is surely regrettable that Chief Judge Lippman’s concern with constitutional compliance appears to be the exception, and not the rule.
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The inelasticity of indigent-defense underfunding to outcomes in postconviction review directly undermines the descriptive plausibility of a moral hazard theory of federal habeas. But
it also has an indirect effect: state-court judges necessarily rely
on defense counsel to identify constitutional questions. Inadequate funding and overwhelming caseloads blunt defense counsel’s ability to flag constitutional questions. Subject to lopsided
epistemic updating from defense and prosecution,251 state judges
may be in no position to identify, let alone remedy, the full panoply of constitutional concerns implicated in a given case. The
moral hazard effect of habeas under these circumstances may be
limited.
Even though the Track One/Track Two distinction can be explained in terms of moral hazard, in sum, the case for anticipating
nontrivial moral hazard effects from federal postconviction review
is fragile. To the extent that habeas is intended to diminish the
net frequency of constitutional violations, therefore, it is not clear
that any scaling back based on moral hazard concerns is warranted. It follows that the theory does not provide a plausible explanation of what the Court is doing in its two-track habeas jurisprudence.
2. The “sentinel effect” of habeas.
An alternative feedback mechanism linking state-court process and federal habeas is a “sentinel effect,” whereby the prospect of subsequent review induces greater care on the part of the
front-line decision maker.252 The possibility of a sentinel effect
was first identified in the medical literature, in which it generated a justification for securing second opinions on recommended
surgeries as a means toward reducing the number of unnecessary
medical interventions.253 In the habeas context, the argument
would be that the prospect of later review for constitutional error
induces greater care on the part of state judges. Judges would
have to be motivated by a preference for not being contradicted by
251 See Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 975–76 (cited in note 245) (noting asymmetry, and explaining that “[f]elony defenders also have little time to meet with their clients. . . . Their only communication with each client may be no more than a hurried conversation in a courtroom hallway or holding cell in the few minutes before a court
appearance”).
252 Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 Va L Rev 1435,
1464 (2011).
253 See Suzanne Grisez Martin, et al, Impact of a Mandatory Second-Opinion Program
on Medicaid Surgery Rates, 20 Med Care 21, 31–32 (1982).
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a federal judge and would have a sufficiently low discount rate so
as to be motivated by the specter of federal habeas relief some
ways down the road. (Note that this is the opposite assumption to
the one underpinning a moral hazard theory of habeas, which posits that state judges dial down efforts when their errors are fixed
in subsequent federal collateral review.) The allocation to petitioners of the decision to invoke habeas, additionally, would increase the chance that postconviction review would pick up instances of false positives in state adjudications.254
The two-track model of habeas cannot, however, be explained
in terms of sentinel effects or some similar deterrence-based account.255 If federal invigilation of constitutional compliance in
state criminal adjudication increased compliance rates with the
relevant rights, then the two-track model has matters exactly
backwards. At present, the intensity of federal review is greatest
when state courts have not had an opportunity to pass on a legal
question. By contrast, adjudication of a claim on either substantive or procedural grounds moves a claim into Track One, in
which a state judge’s reasoning is likely to receive little or no scrutiny.
Within Track One, the doctrine elicits reductions in state
judges’ care respecting constitutional error. The treatment of
summary opinions as merits judgments,256 for example, effectively
imposes a tax on reasoned adjudication by state courts. Confronting a summary opinion, a habeas petitioner must address all potential reasonable explanations of the outcome in order to secure
relief.257 By contrast, a reasoned opinion narrows the field of potential explanations, giving the petitioner a precise target. State

254 See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J Legal
Stud 379, 381 (1995) (arguing for investments in appellate review rather than a better
trial process, because “litigants possess information about the occurrence of error and appeals courts can frequently verify it”).
255 The doctrine, though, creates obviously powerful incentives for habeas petitioners
to turn square corners in state court. For two reasons, it is doubtful this feedback effect is
effectual. First, it is hardly clear that noncapital petitioners have any significant incentive
to engage in strategic deferment (or sandbagging) in the first place. See Morrison, 477 US
at 382 n 7. Second, the sanctioning of petitioners based on defaults by omission in state
court is unlikely to have much effect on state-funded defense counsel, who do not bear
those costs. Only by imposing a formalist model of agency between petitioner and counsel—a formalism that flies in the teeth of the available empirical evidence—does this deterrence mechanism even begin to make sense.
256 See Richter, 131 S Ct at 784–85.
257 See text accompanying notes 85–92.
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judges seeking insulation from reversal have a new reason to expend less, rather than more, work on drafting opinions. A similar
dynamic logic operates in respect to Pinholster’s new constraints
on the evidentiary basis of merits review.258 By limiting merits
review to the record before the state court that adjudicated a constitutional claim, the Court encourages state courts to be chary in
their admissibility and discovery decisions259 even as it “places an
extraordinary premium on effective fact development at the state
level.”260 By imposing strict limits on a defendant’s ability to introduce exculpatory or mitigating evidence through “independent
and adequate”261 time limits, state courts can further buffer themselves from habeas’s sentinel effect. Retail decisions to deny expansions of the record, which since 2009 have been treated as adequate and independent procedural bars,262 may further conduce
to a diminished prospect of effective collateral review.
Rather than having a benevolent sentinel effect, therefore,
two-track habeas may undermine observable signals of state
criminal adjudications’ quality. The basic insight here was powerfully articulated by the late Professor William Stuntz. He observed that procedural constraints on law enforcement “[create] a
series of political taxes and subsidies, making some kinds of legislation and law enforcement more expensive and others
cheaper.”263 As a result, Stuntz argued, criminal-procedure rules
often had perverse effects because they leave “[p]oliticians [ ] freest to regulate where regulation is most likely to be one-sided and
punitive.”264 Two-track habeas is akin to other forms of regulation
in that it makes one activity more costly than an obvious substi-

258

See Pinholster, 131 S Ct at 1388.
See, for example, Wiseman, 53 BC L Rev at 968–71 (cited in note 11) (showing how
Pinholster has changed the evidentiary demands that federal habeas courts place on their
state counterparts).
260 Id at 972. A different issue is presented if a petitioner seeks factual development
in the state court and is denied.
261 Coleman, 501 US at 729.
262 See Beard v Kindler, 130 S Ct 612, 618 (2009) (holding that “a discretionary state
procedural rule can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas review”).
263 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv L Rev
781, 782 (2006). See also William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo Wash L Rev 1265, 1274 (1999) (arguing that criminal-procedure rules “[act]
as a tax, a mechanism for making some activities more expensive relative to their substitutes”).
264 Stuntz, 119 Harv L Rev at 783 (cited in note 263). See also William J. Stuntz, Race,
Class, and Drugs, 98 Colum L Rev 1795, 1819–24 (1998) (developing the perverse-effects
argument in respect to the Fourth Amendment).
259
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tute. The taxed activity here is careful adjudication of constitutional criminal-procedure issues. The obvious and readily available substitute is less attentive adjudication. Richter and Pinholster, that is, are subsidies for constitutional slovenliness.
In a sense, the two-track model’s incentive effects stand in
opposition to the incentive effects that Stuntz inveighed against.
But it is important to see that the two sets of incentives (those
identified in Stuntz’s path-marking work and those elaborated
here) do not offset each other. Stuntz argued that the response to
Warren Court criminal-procedure rules was greater punitiveness
in criminal legislation and sentencing.265 But the inflationary dynamic of criminal penalties and sentencing has already occurred:
the operation of two-track habeas today does nothing to mitigate
the “pathological” punitiveness to which Stuntz objected for the
simple reason that its effects occur only after state legislatures
have ramped up the scope and weight of criminal law.266 Hence, it
seems likely that two-track habeas will exacerbate overcriminalization and punitive sentencing policies by making convictions
easier to obtain.
Of course, this assumes feedback is indeed transmitted between state and federal judiciaries via habeas relief. But this requires “that the low habeas grant rate [ ] reflects the effective deterrence of constitutional violations by the threat of habeas
review.”267 It may instead be, as Hoffmann and King suggest, that
most sentences are too short to allow habeas review, that defendants waive access to collateral relief in plea bargains, that statecourt evidentiary records are unlikely to support Sixth Amendment relief, and that federal intervention is too “infrequent” to
have any deterrent effect.268 These arguments, however, do not
undermine the possibility of perverse feedback effects. To the contrary, the first two points made by Hoffmann and King in fact
may reflect state courts’ efforts to avoid federal habeas review by
265 See Stuntz, 119 Harv L Rev at 802 (cited in note 263) (explaining how constitutional criminal procedure has “encourage[d] legislatures to expand criminal codes and to
enact tougher sentencing rules”).
266 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
Mich L Rev 505 (2001).
267 Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 810 (cited in note 7).
268 Id at 810–11. Hoffmann and King are not entirely consistent on this point. They
elsewhere argue that wholesale reform of federal habeas, which they propose, might tempt
states into “reducing or eliminating their own postconviction review procedures.” Id at
835. In this passage, Hoffmann and King suggest that federal habeas has a deterrence
effect in regard to state procedural safeguards. This seems in tension with their skepticism
elsewhere of deterrence effects.

03 HUQ_ART_FLIP (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/11/2014 11:09 AM

Habeas and the Roberts Court

581

awarding shorter sentences and encouraging plea-bargained
waivers. They are consistent, that is, with the existence of feedback effects.
Their last two points are also consistent with the perverse
feedback effects I have identified. Scantier evidentiary records,
summary decisions, and low rates of relief are all consequences of
the specific contours of two-track habeas. That is, they might reflect strategies deployed by state judges to minimize the tax imposed by federal habeas review by shifting toward less observable
ways so as to continue dubiously constitutional modalities of
criminal adjudication. They are possible evidence of efforts to vitiate habeas’s substance if not evade it entirely.
Sentinel effects, in sum, provide little justification for the
two-track-habeas model. Rather, attention to how the incentive
effects of postconviction review are distributed suggests that the
model has undesirable, even perverse, social-welfare effects.
***
Two kinds of feedback mechanisms can be posited as justifications for two-track habeas. A moral hazard theory would justify
the bifurcated structure of the current doctrine. A sentinel-effect
theory would not. The empirical presuppositions of moral hazard
theory, however, are not satisfied. And attention to sentinel effects reveals a potential for perverse consequences given prevailing rules. No less than sorting theories, theories based on feedback loops provide no compelling normative warrant for the
doctrinal status quo.
D. Habeas and the Distribution of Constitutional Fault
A third possible account of the two-track model of habeas focuses on the role of fault as a key to constitutional remedies. On
this view, two-track habeas is a mechanism to identify the
tranche of cases in which there is a large asymmetry in fault between the petitioner and the state. Only by demonstrating his or
her own exceptional blamelessness (in Track Two) or the exceptional blameworthiness of the state (in Track One) can a petitioner succeed in securing relief from a federal habeas court. On
this account, postconviction jurisprudence has moved into alignment with its remedial kin—the law of constitutional tort.
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1. Fault as lodestar.
A threshold reason to take fault seriously as a key to understanding the two-track model of habeas is the organizing role that
it plays in other domains of constitutional remedial doctrine. With
the exception of municipal liability,269 the absolute immunity of
states and state agencies270 means that a constitutional-tort plaintiff must sue state officials in their individual capacities in order
to secure money damages based on a constitutional tort.271 Officials, however, are “protected by qualified immunity, a faultbased standard approximating negligence as to illegality.”272 Over
time, the liability rule has gone “well beyond shielding reasonable
error” to demand a showing akin to “gross negligence.”273 Fault
terminology also leaks into the Fourth Amendment context, in
which the invalidity of a warrant no longer requires exclusion unless an officer acts with “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct” or with “recurring or systemic negligence.”274 Hence,
when a police officer violates a constitutional norm that is minted
by the Court only after the relevant conduct, the Court has rejected the remedy of exclusion, intimating that the officer is not
to blame.275
In perhaps the most influential work on constitutional tort,
Professor John Jeffries has suggested that the centrality of fault
is best explained in terms of a “noninstrumental conception” of
corrective justice, according to which “fault supplies [a justifying]
moral dimension” for the “restorative transfer from wrongdoer to
victim.”276 Much the same dynamic has been identified in the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule context.277
269 See Monell v Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 US 658,
701 (1978) (holding that municipalities can be sued under 42 USC § 1983); Owen v City of
Independence, 445 US 622, 638 (1980) (imposing strict liability on municipalities). But see
City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 US 247, 271 (1981) (holding that municipalities
are absolutely immune from punitive damages).
270 See Will v Michigan Department of State Police, 491 US 58, 65–66, 71 (1989).
271 See Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 807–08, 815 (1982).
272 Jeffries, 99 Va L Rev at 208 (cited in note 30).
273 Id at 258 (“Whatever the label, qualified immunity has evolved toward an overly
legalistic and therefore overly protective shield against liability for constitutional torts.”).
274 Herring v United States, 129 S Ct 695, 702 (2009); United States v Leon, 468 US
897, 913 (1984) (recognizing a good faith exception to Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule when officers reasonably rely on a faulty warrant).
275 See Davis v United States, 131 S Ct 2419, 2423–24 (2011).
276 John C. Jeffries Jr, Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 Mich L Rev 82, 93–95 (1989).
277 See, for example, Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal
Borrowing and Convergence, 111 Colum L Rev 670, 706 (2011) (suggesting the Court’s
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At first blush, the concept of fault seems to run substantially
into the concept of egregious constitutional error discussed earlier
in this Part. But they are not quite the same. Fault, unlike error,
is a relational concept. Rather than being measured against a
baseline of constitutional compliance, fault contrasts the blameworthiness of the state actor and the blamelessness (vel non) of
the criminal defendant turned habeas petitioner. It also provides
a normative foundation for a “restorative transfer.” As I use the
term here, fault therefore implies an asymmetrical relationship
between the petitioner and the state that yields a distinctive normative evaluation and recommendation. Such an asymmetry is
wanting when a grievous constitutional error is made, but a petitioner nevertheless egregiously fails to press and seek timely judicial consideration of that error.
Fault, again as I will use the term, can also be established
with a greater variety of tools than a mere showing of one-sided
egregious constitutional error. Most pertinent here, it can be established by showing an ordinary error coupled with an exceptional degree of blamelessness on the petitioner’s part, as well as
by pointing to an exceptionally culpable fumble by the state.
To a startling degree, this symmetrical, moralized conception
of fault fits well with the observed doctrinal contours of two-track
habeas just as it fits the law of constitutional torts and (increasingly) the operation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
To begin with, within Track One it is tolerably clear that a petitioner cannot secure relief without a showing of extraordinary
fault—one might even say “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct”278—on the part of a state court. The alignment of
Track One with a conception of fault drawn from the constitutional-tort context is amplified by the tailored scope of the habeas
court’s inquiry: after AEDPA as modified by Pinholster, the federal habeas court is constrained not only to the universe of Supreme Court cases that obtained at the precise moment at which
a state court rendered the relevant judgment, but also to the four
corners of the record before that court. This is so however powerful the petitioner’s reasons for omitting evidence, and however
compelling that evidence might be. It hardly makes sense to impose these limitations on a federal court in searching for constitutional error or innocence, or seeking to optimize the state
impetus for “conceiving of the exclusionary rule as a remedy premised upon fault and desert” derives from constitutional-tort doctrine).
278 Herring, 129 S Ct at 702.
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court’s incentives. To the contrary, a leading economic theory of
appellate review points out that it is precisely the fact that appeals may select for “the subset of cases in which errors were more
probably made” and may allow appellants to flag those errors that
makes such second opinions worthwhile.279 The observed limitations on habeas relief, though, comfortably fit with the judicial
labor of winnowing out extraordinarily wrongful state-court decisions.280
Fault also helps explain the asymmetric treatment of litigation error on the part of petitioners and the state within Track
One. For example, whereas state miscalculations of AEDPA’s
complex timeliness rule are treated with leniency,281 petitioner
and defense-counsel errors (such as mistakenly filing in federal
rather than state court first) are viewed with Spartan disdain.282
This is so even if most petitioner errors are more fairly described
as the errors of (state-selected and state-funded) counsel.283 Yet
little short of abandonment by counsel seems sufficient to warrant extenuation of Track One’s procedural rigors.284
At least superficially, this distribution of equitable relief from
litigation error seems perverse. The state, after all, is the repeat
player, and so is better able to internalize knowledge of the complexities of habeas law. Habeas petitioners, by contrast, are typically uncounseled, often one-shot players (at least outside the capital context, in which counsel is more often available); they are
more likely to be subject to cognitive and epistemic constraints
than the state’s lawyers. To extenuate the former, but not the latter, makes sense only if the habeas court’s ultimate touchstone is
the presence of extraordinary fault by the state.
279

Shavell, 24 J Legal Stud at 381 (cited in note 254).
After Martinez and Trevino, this includes both state trial courts and state collateral review.
281 See Day, 547 US at 208–09. Deliberate state forfeitures, by contrast, are subject
to a more unforgiving rule. See Wood v Milyard, 132 S Ct 1826, 1830 (2012).
282 See Duncan v Walker, 533 US 167, 180 (2001) (emphasizing the need to incentivize
petitioner compliance with AEDPA’s statute of limitations). See also Pace v DiGuglielmo,
544 US 408, 427 (2005) (Stevens dissenting).
283 Federal courts have systematically ignored the paradox that results from attributing state-funded lawyers’ errors to petitioners when those errors are more plausibly
traced back to (under-)funding decisions by state legislatures. For a rare instance of judicial attention to that question, see Dunphy v McKee, 134 F3d 1297, 1299 (7th Cir 1998).
284 See Maples, 132 S Ct at 922 (stressing that mere negligence by defense counsel
will not excuse a procedural default). For a criticism of the pinched view of equitable discretion evinced in Maples, see Adam Liptak, Agency and Equity: Why Do We Blame Clients
for Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 110 Mich L Rev 875, 885 (2012) (“Agency principles can only
do so much work, and at some point equity must matter, too.”).
280
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A related conception of fault animates Track Two. Here
again, an exceptional measure of blamelessness—in the form of
concatenated error and the seriatim failure to address a petitioner’s constitutional claims—opens the door to serious consideration of the state’s omission or error, which need not be so grave
in magnitude. To be sure, concatenated error can occur without
any fault on the state’s part.285 But there Track Two petitioners
must in effect again demonstrate a large gap between their own
blamelessness and the state’s conduct. In Professor Anthony Amsterdam’s words, they must show conformity with “a standard
that can only be described as the squeaky clean test.”286 Even having navigated the serial showings necessary to enter Track Two,
a petitioner must still demonstrate some degree of fault on a state
court’s part. At a minimum, the petitioner must still point to a
constitutional error287 and then overcome both the harmless error
standard288 and the general rule against retroactive application of
constitutional rules.289 Hence, Track Two might be understood to
treat the extraordinary blamelessness of the petitioner as a substitute for the supernumerary demand for state fault that is levied in Track One.
In short, the Court has imported a specific conception of faultbased limitations in suits against the state by habeas petitioners
from the context of suits against the state by constitutional-tort
plaintiffs. The pivotal concept of fault, to be sure, is not clearly
stated in the jurisprudence and is ambiguous in its precise application. Nevertheless, it can be understood to pick out instances of
egregious noncompliance with a relevant rule or standard, as well

285 Justice Alito makes this point in his Maples concurrence, in which he notes that
gross attorney error can occur regardless of the specifics of the state’s scheme for appointing counsel to indigent defendants. Maples, 132 S Ct at 928–29 (Alito concurring).
286 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the
Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Nov 22, 2004, 33 Hofstra
L Rev 403, 411 (2004).
287 See 28 USC §§ 2243, 2254(a) (predicating habeas relief on a violation of the US
Constitution, laws, or treaties).
288 See Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 637 (1993). Strickland and Brady claims,
though, already require a showing of prejudice in order to obtain relief, making Brecht less
significant.
289 Formally, the nonretroactivity rule of the plurality in Teague v Lane, 489 US 288,
310 (1989) (plurality), would apply even after a petitioner passes through the Track Two
gateways to reach the merits. For an example of the stringency with which Teague is applied, see Horn v Banks, 536 US 266, 271 (2002) (holding that Teague can apply even when
the state court ignores that rule).
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as other instances in which there is a large gap in the blameworthiness of the petitioner and the state, while leaving open how to
calibrate egregiousness and how to treat cases of bilateral fault.
2. Why fault?
Why, though, should this particular conception of fault provide a lodestar to guide the doctrinal development of postconviction habeas? After all, there is no reason that constitutional-tort
damages, the application of the exclusionary rule, and habeas relief should all be geared to the same standard. Moreover, fault is
hardly a unitary concept, and it is certainly possible to imagine
other, less normative but efficiency-oriented ways of conceptualizing that term.290
A threshold possibility might build on Professor Richard Fallon’s “Equilibration Thesis,” which posits that “courts, and especially the Supreme Court, decide cases by seeking what they regard as an acceptable overall alignment of doctrines involving
justiciability, substantive rights, and available remedies.”291 With
the exception of some species of equitably titrated injunctive relief, the results of my analysis suggest that the Court seems to
have installed a transsubstantive rule of fault on remedies that
conjoins constitutional-tort rules, the exclusionary rule, and habeas.292 Private plaintiffs seeking divergent remedies—whether it
be the exclusion of inculpatory evidence, money damages, or vacatur of a state-court conviction—must confront and overcome the
same bar to liability.
But if this account goes long on consistency, it is not clear
what else recommends it. Perhaps habeas, suppression, and
money damages are pure substitutes for a small domain of Fourth
Amendment violations, but they do not generally operate as natural alternatives. There is hence no reason to enforce remedial

290 For a brief but illuminating survey of some of the legal issues related to defining
fault in another legal context, contract law, see generally Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat, Foreword: Fault in American Contract Law, 107 Mich L Rev 1341 (2009).
291 Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Linkage between Justiciability and Remedies—And
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 Va L Rev 633, 637 (2006).
292 I have argued elsewhere that transsubstantive spillover effects have an important
causal role in doctrinal development in public law. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Against
National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 S Ct Rev 225.
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conformity to limit litigant gamesmanship.293 The reasons commonly adduced for a fault-centered jurisprudence of constitutional-tort law cannot be straightforwardly translated over to the
habeas context. Qualified immunity has been justified, for example, by the concern that courts would otherwise hesitate before
expanding constitutional rights.294 The same justification does not
apply to the habeas context. Long before the development of twotrack habeas, the Court in Teague v Lane295 imposed a nonretroactivity rule on federal collateral review that obviates any friction
on doctrinal evolution by imposing, in effect, a fault standard on
state courts.296 Teague’s nonretroactivity rule is an early incarnation of fault’s role in habeas. And Teague could have been the limit
of fault’s relevance. As Justice Stevens emphasized in his plurality opinion in Terry Williams, AEDPA’s standard of review for legal error could quite plausibly have been read as codifying the
Teague rule.297 Of course, Justice Stevens did not command a majority in Terry Williams. Instead, the more stringent reading of
the statute initially adopted by Justice O’Connor has been entrenched and even reinforced by Richter.298 The ensuing overlay
of two-track habeas on Teague arguably adds little marginal insulation that might tend to promote or enable legal change.299 To
the contrary, two-track habeas may have a net retarding effect on
doctrinal efflorescence by limiting opportunities for legal development to the context of direct review of state supreme court judgments300—a context, of course, in which not all constitutional errors will be in evidence.301

293 The problem of gamesmanship animates the Court’s treatment of the overlap between habeas and 42 USC § 1983. See, for example, Heck v Humphrey, 512 US 477, 481–
82 (1994).
294 See John C. Jeffries Jr, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L
J 87, 98–100 (1999).
295 489 US 288 (1989).
296 Id at 288 (plurality).
297 See Terry Williams, 529 US at 384–90 & n 14 (plurality).
298 See text accompanying notes 68–90.
299 This is quite aside from the question of whether the Roberts Court seeks breathing
room to expand criminal-procedure entitlements—a supposition that might reasonably be
doubted.
300 The Court could begin accepting more certiorari petitions from state postconviction judgments. See generally Giovanna Shay and Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New
Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari
from Judgments of State Courts, 50 Wm & Mary L Rev 211 (2008). This has not happened
yet.
301 Both doctrines provide for resolution of a case in the state’s favor without reaching
a ruling on the precise contours of the underlying law. See Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA,
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Nor is it possible to transpose the other leading account of
qualified immunity to the habeas context. This account insists on
the need to liberate state officials to “act upon their own free, unbiased convictions, uninfluenced by any apprehensions.”302 This
account rests on the observation that officials typically do not internalize all positive externalities from their decisions, and a liability rule forcing them to internalize negative externalities
would create an undesirable asymmetry in incentives and so
lower levels of desirable government action.303 There is no parallel
asymmetry, though, in the habeas context. Judges do not internalize the cost of habeas relief (as opposed to the costs of habeas
adjudication) in the same way they might internalize moneydamages remedies. Even a strict liability rule on collateral review
would engender no asymmetrical incentives concern. Hence, the
reasons normally offered for limiting the availability of tort damages for constitutional violations do not easily translate to the habeas context.
I therefore conclude that it is not possible to adduce a decisive
explanation for the salience of fault in organizing the two-track
model of habeas beyond the aesthetic appeal of uniformity across
divergent constitutional remedies. Nevertheless, in the absence
of more secure evidence, I will offer a hypothesis. A dominant
characteristic of the American criminal-justice system since the
1970s has been its engorging volume.304 Between 1972 and 2012,
the US prison population grew by 705 percent.305 Whereas “[i]n
the early 1980s most state felony offenders served, on average,
sixteen to seventeen months,” by 2006 the “average felony sentence in state court exceeded four years.”306 This development is

Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 Seattle U
L Rev 595, 598–601 (2009).
302 Filarsky v Delia, 132 S Ct 1657, 1661–62 (2012) (citation omitted).
303 See Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 59–
81 (Yale 1983). See also Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 Wash L Rev 635, 638–40 (1982) (extending the same asymmetric-incentives argument to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
304 See generally Justice Policy Institute, The Punishing Decade: Prison and Jail Estimates at the Millennium (May 2000), online at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images
/upload/00-05_rep_punishingdecade_ac.pdf (visited May 21, 2014).
305 Pew Center on the States, Prison Count 2010: State Population Declines for the
First Time in 38 Years *1 (Apr 2010), online at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles
/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/Prison_Count_2010.pdf (visited
May 21, 2014).
306 Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 Hastings L J 423, 430 n 38
(2013).
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unmatched in other industrialized nations.307 It is a unique, and
historically novel, political economy of mass incarceration.
Habeas provides no obvious solution for the pathologies of
mass incarceration because of the prevalence of plea bargaining
and the inability of many prisoners to access postconviction review before being released.308 But that does not mean mass incarceration has no effect on federal postconviction institutions. Rather, the new political economy of penality imposes two strains on
federal postconviction relief that together yield a vice-like
squeeze. First, increases in the numbers of prisoners serving sentences long enough to enable them to seek habeas relief seems to
have outpaced the ability of federal courts to maintain the same
quality and quantity of per capita attention. As a result, resource
constraints pinch with increasing vigor over time. Second, the
growing volume of criminal defendants—many indigent309—has
not been accompanied by a commensurate growth in the nation’s
fiscal commitments to effective indigent defense representation.
To the contrary, overwhelming evidence suggests that fiscal provision for indigent-defense counsel has failed to keep up with demand.310 Hence, the dynamic that dilutes the capacity of the federal courts to give individualized attention to constitutional
violations in discrete cases also increases the frequency of Sixth
Amendment violations. Demand for postconviction relief correspondingly inflates as supply dwindles.
The increased cost of searching for and identifying errors—to
say nothing of the political costs of granting relief—places immense new strains on the federal judiciary. There is much greater
pressure to tolerate a lower threshold of effective counsel lest the

307 See Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (Ninth Edition) *1 (International
Centre for Prison Studies July 2011), online at http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads
/2010/09/WPPL-9-22.pdf (visited May 21, 2014) (“The United States has the highest prison
population rate in the world, 743 per 100,000.”); Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate 15–20,
figs 2-1, 2-2 (New Press 1999).
308 See Traum, 64 Hastings L J at 446–47 (cited in note 306).
309 A Department of Justice study found that 82 percent of those charged with a felony
offense in large state courts received appointed counsel by the end of their case. See Caroline Wolf Harlow, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases *1 (Department of Justice Nov
2000), online at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf (visited May 21, 2014). Increasing income inequality means this figure is likely higher now. There is a tight bilateral
causal relationship, moreover, between exposure to the criminal-justice system and poverty. See Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America 11–33 (Russell Sage
Foundation 2006).
310 See note 6.
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number of successful constitutional challenges prove either systemically burdensome or politically unsustainable. The overload
also inculcates skepticism: “He who must search a haystack for a
needle,” noted Justice Robert Jackson long ago, “is likely to end
up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.”311
Over time though, the haystack has taken on dimensions Jackson
could hardly have conjured.
Conservative or liberal, justices sitting in the apex court may
well be aware of the acute systemic pressures these countervailing forces impose on the federal judiciary. Conservative or liberal,
the justices’ motivations more than likely “are shaped in part by
a sense of institutional duty.”312 If this hypothesis of institutional
identification is plausible, it may be that justices of all ideological
stripes perceive a need to converge on some tool for rationing habeas in an era of waxing demand and waning supply. My hypothesis is that fault has played that role. Fault, as a concept drawn
from corrective justice, provides an implicit intellectual framework that is, at least on its face, somewhat orthogonal to otherwise powerful liberal and conservative policy preferences about
the states’ criminal-justice systems.313 Reliance on a concept of
fault obscures the extent to which it is the federal judiciary’s institutional compulsions that are driving the narrowing gyre of habeas relief notwithstanding the eroding institutions of state criminal-justice administration.314 It also borrows from an area of law,
constitutional tort, perceived as contiguous to habeas, and hence
ripe for doctrinal transplantation.315 Fault therefore provides a
useful focal point for channeling concerns about institutional
overload into doctrinal limits on habeas relief.
311

Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson concurring).
Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate
Federal Statutes?, 101 Am Polit Sci Rev 321, 323 (2007).
313 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U Toronto L J 349, 349
(2002) (“Corrective justice is the idea that liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by one
person on another.”). This formulation leaves open the degree of fault required to trigger
a duty of rectification—which, of course, is the battlefield on which the scope of modern
habeas is decided.
314 Conversely, however, expansions of federal judicial power are “effected by acts of
Congress.” Justin Crowe, Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development 273 (Princeton 2012). The distinctive, asymmetrical politics of jurisdictional expansion and contraction is an interesting topic that warrants its own separate
treatment beyond my scope here.
315 See Joseph L. Hoffmann and William J. Stuntz, Habeas after the Revolution, 1993
S Ct Rev 65, 66 (“Habeas issues have thus been seen as ‘of a kind’ with issues that arise
in Section 1983 litigation, the immunity of state governments and officials, Younger v Harris abstention, and the Eleventh Amendment.”).
312
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But this is not to say that fault concepts are not always uncontroversial among the justices, or that convergence on a fault
standard precludes ideologically tinged disagreement. When the
Court began importing inchoate versions of the fault concept into
habeas jurisprudence in the late 1970s in cases such as Wainwright v Sykes,316 fault was a divisive conceptual borrowing. Judicial restriction of habeas relief then reflected the same dynamics
of conservative political pressure that were catalyzing the Court’s
larger punitive turn in criminal justice.317
In contrast, the ideological consensus on fault that I have posited emerges somewhat later, at a time at which the docket pressures instigated by mass incarceration were becoming clearer to
the Court. By the time the two-track model of habeas had developed, moreover, fault had also crystallized as the dominant and
broadly accepted lodestar in the constitutional-tort context.318 It
was only more slowly, with the numbing caress of time’s passage,
that fault filtered into habeas jurisprudence’s mainstream and
then calcified as an intellectual touchstone that could transcend
ideological divisions in order to resolve, at least on the surface,
the rationing problem fostered by mass incarceration.
Of course, agreement on a general principle of fault, at least
as defined as egregious noncompliance with standing rules or
norms, does not preclude sharp, ideological differences on doctrinal mechanics. Nevertheless, the vocabulary and conceptual baggage of fault might be not only a point of consensus, but also an
arena for contestation and debate using a shared, nonideological
vocabulary. Indeed, it may be a virtue of a fault-oriented framework that its foundational concept is highly plastic and can be
tweaked or perhaps even reimagined without shedding the vocabulary of previous cases.
316

433 US 72 (1977).
Empirical work by Katherine Beckett demonstrates that shifting public and political attitudes toward crime from the 1960s onward were consequences of “the definitional
activities of state actors and the mass media”—beginning with Barry Goldwater’s campaign focus on street crime—rather than a response to increasing levels of criminality.
Katherine Beckett, Setting the Public Agenda: “Street Crime” and Drug Use in American
Politics, 41 Soc Probs 425, 426–27 (1994). See generally Katherine Beckett, Making Crime
Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics (Oxford 1997). Neither Beckett’s
article nor her book, both of which are otherwise insightful and rewarding, addresses the
role of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts. But it seems plausible to posit that those bodies
are among the “state actors” that kindled newly punitive public attitudes.
318 See Jeffries, 99 Va L Rev at 250–58 (cited in note 30) (recounting doctrinal development). The earliest uses of fault in constitutional-tort doctrine predate Sykes. See, for
example, Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308, 322 (1975).
317
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One might hence gloss the debates about the state’s culpability in Martinez and Trevino, or the appropriate demand on defense counsel in Maples and Holland, as part of an ongoing contestation over the meaning of fault. That the Court can continue
these debates within the delimited vocabulary of fault suggests
that the latter concept at present succeeds in providing a bridge
across otherwise recalcitrant ideological divides—a common
ground on which to pursue or to divide over when self-serving institutional interests should trump the federal courts’ care for individuals’ constitutional entitlement.
This hypothesis, alas, may want for many testable predictions any time soon. One exception, though, concerns the extension of the Martinez rule to issues other than the Sixth Amendment’s promise of effective assistance of counsel. For example, in
October 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Martinez does not extend to claims that the state failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v Maryland319 over a
powerful dissent by Judge William Fletcher.320 Yet the overall
fault-oriented structure of habeas jurisprudence suggests that
Brady claims are an even stronger candidate for exculpating
cause than Strickland claims: by definition, an undiscovered
Brady violation is not one that a petitioner can reasonably be
blamed for having omitted.
Zooming out, the picture may be less amenable to interpretation. Recent years have witnessed a slight dip in national incarceration rates.321 It is thus possible that the conditions that produced two-track habeas will recede within the imaginable future.
But there is no reason to think that the two-track model of habeas
will deliquesce in lockstep. Doctrinal and analytic structures can
outlive their precipitating causes as a result of institutional inertia and path-dependency dynamics.322 These forces are exacerbated in the judicial context by the institutional tic of stare decisis. Even absent its natal conditions, therefore, a bifurcated

319

373 US 83 (1963).
See Hunton v Sinclair, 2013 WL 5583975, *1 (9th Cir). See also Hodges v Colson,
727 F3d 517, 540 (6th Cir 2013) (intimating that Martinez and Trevino do not extend beyond the Sixth Amendment context).
321 See Lauren E. Glaze and Erika Parks, Correctional Populations in the United
States, 2011 *1 (Department of Justice Nov 12, 2012), online at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf (visited Dec 3, 2013) (noting a three-year decline in the correctional population).
322 See Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 17–
18 (Princeton 2004).
320
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system of habeas may endure as a stable “jurisprudential regime”
for years to come.323
E.

Summary

It is tempting to write off the Roberts Court’s approach to habeas cases as merely another instance of the diffuse, reflective judicial hostility toward criminal defendants that has infused the
apex tribunal’s jurisprudence since the Burger Court.324 The
temptation, though, should be resisted. The transformation of habeas into its current bifurcated structure is the work not of an
ideologically coherent coalition of justices, but of ideologically heterogeneous supermajorities. Accordingly, it is necessary to seek
an explanation that works across ideological lines. Federalism, I
have suggested, is a poor candidate in this regard. Instead, I have
developed three potential explanations of two-track habeas and
suggested that one matches observed outcomes better than the
other two. First, habeas does not function well as a sorting mechanism notwithstanding the obvious screening effects it has. Second, the two-track model of habeas is poorly explained in terms of
its incentive effects on state-court actors. Functionalist explanations, that is, fall short.
Instead, perhaps the most promising explanation of twotrack habeas centers on the concept of fault. The doctrine selects
for a narrow class of cases in which there is an exceptional asymmetry between the blameworthiness of the petitioner and the
blameworthiness of the state. In Track One, petitioners prevail
by demonstrating exceptional state fault; in Track Two, they prevail by showing their own extraordinary blamelessness. This normative economy of habeas relief, I have suggested, is perhaps best
understood as a way of titrating habeas relief in an era of massive
docket pressures.
III. THE AGENDAS OF HABEAS REFORM
Postconviction-habeas scholarship today, by and large, assumes there is merit in reform and then debates what direction
323 Mark J. Richards and Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme
Court Decision Making, 96 Am Polit Sci Rev 305, 308 (2002) (defining “jurisprudential
regime” as “a key precedent, or a set of related precedents, that structures the way in
which the Supreme Court justices evaluate key elements of cases in arriving at decisions
in a particular legal area”).
324 See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich L Rev 2466, 2467–68 & nn 5–12 (1996).
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such reform should take. That debate, however, has occurred in
the absence of any serious accounting of current doctrinal formations of the sort offered in Part II. In effect, reformist scholarship takes the remedial scarcity of habeas as a given, skips over
the doctrinal predicates of such scarcity, and then offers reform
proposals that account neither for the causal forces that have
shaped the doctrine nor for the policy aims the law currently promotes. There is, in consequence, a touch of Hamlet without the
prince: Scholars give no reason to take the doctrinal status quo as
a given, and yet do. Rather than asking what habeas is for, or
what it ought to be, they ask what habeas can be in light of the
transient political preferences of the day. The resulting inquiry is
perhaps less telling of habeas’s potential than it is of scholars’
pinched political imaginations.
This Part breaks from the consensus approach in the scholarship by considering the implications of the two-track model and
its fault-based logic for one leading habeas reform proposal, which
has been eloquently advanced by Professors Joseph Hoffmann
and Nancy King. I focus on their position not because it is new—
in important ways it largely echoes and updates positions taken
by an earlier generation of habeas commentators such as Judge
Henry Friendly and Professor Paul Bator—but because it is the
most eloquent and cogent formulation among the recent calls to
restrictively reimagine habeas. Taking doctrine seriously, I suggest, demonstrates the fragility of their proposals. Rather than
adding to the overstuffed catalog of ambitious reform proposals
likely to gather dust on law-library shelves, I offer instead some
reasons to think that the two-track model of habeas as it now exists can be useful as a discrete instrument within the much larger
project of reforming larger criminal law institutions in ways that
improve social welfare.
In this final Part of the Article, I should flag here, I move from
the descriptive to the normative. I identify the possibility of larger
criminal-justice reform with the potential for net social welfare
gains. By positing a connection between habeas and a larger reformist project, I plainly endorse the desirability of that project,
although I do not fully defend its substantive merits here. Readers should therefore be aware that this last Part reflects my own
normative views to an extent that the Article until now has not.

03 HUQ_ART_FLIP (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

A.

Habeas and the Roberts Court

6/11/2014 11:09 AM

595

The Limits of Habeas Reform

In a trenchantly argued article and book, Joseph Hoffmann
and Nancy King have developed a powerful and radical reformist
position. Building on Professor King’s impressive 2009 empirical
study of federal habeas litigation, they predict that “habeas will
. . . be inaccessible to the vast majority of state criminal defendants” because of plea-bargained waivers and short sentences and
that even for prisoners with access to federal collateral review,
the inadequate development of claims in state court will doom
them to procedural default.325 Taking this bleak landscape as a
given—and without considering whether a different standard of
relief or more generous evidentiary rule might change outcomes326—Hoffmann and King conclude that noncapital habeas
should be scrapped except for “clear and convincing” claims of actual innocence and new constitutional rules made retroactive on
retroactive review.327 “Whatever can be saved by cutting back on
habeas review,” they suggest, should be allocated to funding indigent defense.328
Comparison with the two-track model of habeas brings into
focus an important set of puzzles about the Hoffmann-King proposal.329 I have argued that the two-track model of habeas is best
understood as a means of rationing federal court time and labor
in a fashion that cuts across ideological lines. In effect, what Hoffmann and King propose is simply a new rationing device. Under
their proposal, scarce federal judicial attention and remedial
power would be channeled toward cases of actual innocence rather than according to concepts of fault. Their proposal, therefore,
has strong normative credentials to the extent that actual innocence is a more compelling trigger for habeas relief than fault. It

325

Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 814 (cited in note 7).
I am skeptical that this assumption is a defensible one. Given the large body of
evidence demonstrating pervasive constitutional violations in state criminal-justice systems, I am dubious that the currently stringent rules for titrating habeas relief should be
taken for granted. A fortiori, I am highly skeptical that it is appropriate to conclude that
the low rate of relief (which is endogenous to those legal standards) is a justification for
the abolition of most habeas relief.
327 Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 820–21 (cited in note 7).
328 Id at 823–33.
329 For persuasive criticism of this proposal, see generally Primus, Review, 110 Mich
L Rev 887 (cited in note 9); Blume, Johnson, and Weyble, 96 Cornell L Rev 435 (cited in
note 9); Lee Kovarsky, Review, Habeas Verité, 47 Tulsa L Rev 13 (2011). I do not repeat
the powerful criticisms developed by these commentators, criticisms with which I am
largely in accord.
326
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also has an appealing political logic, insofar as it mitigates habeas’s public relations problem as a device that avails the cunning, not the worthy.330
Yet once it is apparent that the central problem habeas must
solve is one of rationing—and that two-track habeas is already
doing one sort of rationing—the Hoffmann-King proposal begets
more questions than answers. To begin with, two of the reasons
Hoffmann and King adduce for the disutility of federal habeas
themselves mitigate the rationing problem. Abbreviating sentences and securing validly bargained-for waivers may constitute
ways of winnowing the pool of state defendants down to a subpopulation that will benefit most from habeas review.331 Assuming,
however, that such winnowing through changed sentencing practice proves insufficient, then Hoffmann and King’s argument boils
down to taking for granted the cohort of procedural bars to habeas
consideration that preclude relief in most cases and refusing to
consider whether any should be relaxed or changed. In harmony
with this strategy, King has argued in recent work that Martinez
(and, presumably, related Track Two cases) will make little difference.332
As an initial matter, it is not clear why the two-track model
of habeas should be accepted as a given, or accepted as entrenched
beyond modification. After all, it is not the work of Congress, but
that of a transient group of federal judges. It is also hardly beyond
reproach. To the contrary, as Part II demonstrated, the two-track
model fails to further central functions of an effective postconviction-review system—preventing serious constitutional error, freeing the innocent, and creating desirable incentives for state actors. Instead, it sits on an arbitraged notion of corrective justice
morality that fits awkwardly with the history and purposes of the
habeas writ. There are ample ways in which scholars and commentators can (and do) argue for mitigating reforms. Indeed, recent Track Two case law demonstrates that the Court’s chosen
vocabulary of fault allows for a surprising degree of internal debate and reform. Hoffmann and King supply no reason for simply
abandoning this doctrinally oriented reformist project, or for
330

See text accompanying notes 219–21.
This assumes, of course, defendants entering plea bargains have “good information” enabling them to “rationally forecas[t] probabilities” of conviction and sentences.
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 Cal L Rev 1117, 1126 (2011). I leave aside the question whether further reforms are warranted to assure that this demanding empirical condition is satisfied.
332 See King, 122 Yale L J at 2449–55 (cited in note 102).
331
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thinking that its expected payoffs are substantially less than the
costly and risky alternative they propose.
Alternatively, perhaps Hoffmann and King’s argument for
major reform relies on an implicit institutional comparison: it
might be that the Court is unlikely to change course on habeas,
while Congress might still enact reform if “extraordinary political
commitment” were exerted.333 In effect Hoffmann and King have
given up on the Court and rest their hopes on Congress.
There are three problems with this notion. First, as Part I
showed, the two-track model—like much of habeas’s evolution—
is largely the Court’s work, not Congress’s. There is no reason to
expect the justices to take a backseat now given the extent of their
historical control over the shape of habeas doctrine. Second, there
is also no clear reason to expect congressional action of the sort
Hoffmann and King propose. Of late, Congress’s inability to fulfill
even basic functions necessary to sustain the national public good
has been painfully clear. But even putting the 2013 debt ceiling
and related government shutdowns aside, there is scant reason to
expect Congress to move more rapidly than the courts. Empirical
work comparing the ideal points of Congress and Supreme Court
along a common metric finds little gap between those two institutions.334 The increasingly conservative cast of the House of Representatives since 2007 and growing legislative gridlock make Hoffmann and King’s optimism about Congress less than obviously
plausible—and this is so even before one accounts for the possibility of future judicial appointments leaning to the liberal side.335
Finally, even if Congress were to act, the fiscal tradeoff Hoffmann and King propose would be implausible and unsustainable.
Although they do not quantify the cost savings of their proposed
pruning of habeas,336 it is hardly tenable to posit that the marginal reduction in the federal budget from trimming 6.77 percent
of the federal court docket will be substantial. For one thing, most

333 Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 833 (cited in note 7). They also seem to
assume that any proposal must be revenue neutral to be feasible.
334 See Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency, 51 Am J Polit Sci 433, 444 (2007) (presenting
historical data about presidential, congressional, and judicial preferences).
335 See Michael J. Tetter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers,
2013 Wisc L Rev 1097, 1104 (noting that the 112th Congress passed only 283 bills and
that this is historically quite low).
336 See Blume, Johnson, and Weyble, 96 Cornell L Rev at 468 (cited in note 9) (making
this complaint).
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of the federal courts’ operating costs are fixed, not variable. Shaving off even one twentieth of the docket is unlikely to make much
difference. Without changing fixed costs (of operating courthouses, paying salaries, running the judiciary’s administrative
structure, and the like), substantial cost savings will in all probability prove a mirage. Stated otherwise, Hoffmann and King implicitly inflate the marginal fiscal benefit of streamlining habeas,
when a fairer assessment would undermine their normative
claims and proposed reforms.
Moreover, their counterproposal is politically flimsy and unlikely to survive long. Hoffmann and King propose a funding
stream to replace a general-purpose institution. Funding streams
must be reappropriated each year. They are vulnerable to diminishment each year. Hostage to legislative fortune in an era of relentless pressure toward austerity, Hoffmann and King’s proposed funding would likely prove far more fragile than current
habeas entitlements, which are bundled into institutional spending packages and hence less vulnerable to erosion.
But there is an even more serious problem with the proposed
rehabilitation of noncapital habeas: two-track habeas currently
manages the rationing problem, arguably with some degree of injustice but with no obvious systemic failures. By contrast, Hoffmann and King’s alternative to the current deployment of fault
as a rationing mechanism is likely to fail, producing systemic difficulties for the judiciary. To see this, notice first that their call
for an innocence-centered writ is rather old hat.337 And Hoffmann
and King do not say anything convincingly about why that call
has for so long been ignored. An obvious explanation is readily at
hand. However normatively compelling it is, innocence cannot
serve as an effectual rationing mechanism for federal habeas in
the way that fault can and does. As Professor Eve Brensike Primus has observed, an innocence standard would not diminish the
volume of habeas petitions filed in federal court.338 Instead, suits
presently framed around the Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel would be repackaged as actual-innocence suits. This
transmigration of claims across legal forms would be worse than
futile. It would raise the per capita cost of resolving cases by replacing legal inquiries into procedural compliance with “resource-

337
338

See, for example, Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev at 142–43 (cited in note 184).
See Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev at 902–03 (cited in note 9).
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intensive” questions about factual innocence.339 Stated in terms of
the signaling theory deployed in Part II, an actual-innocence
threshold for relief will not create a separating equilibrium.340
Both meritorious and meritless petitioners will file petitions asserting superficially colorable innocence claims. Rather than separating different classes of petitioners, an actual-innocence rule
would likely create a pooling equilibrium. The administrative
costs of adjudicating habeas would rise sharply, provoking the
systemic problem that habeas doctrine, at its core, is designed to
mitigate.
Finally, whereas the fault-based framework for habeas is
likely to be relatively stable, an innocence-based one is unlikely
to prove a durable equilibrium. The evolution of two-track habeas
hints at likely judicial responses to the pooling equilibrium that
Hoffmann and King’s proposal would engender: By hook or by
crook, the Court will construe the habeas statute to manage the
ensuing toll on judges’ human capital. The long-term consequence
of Hoffmann and King’s proposal, in short, is likely to be even
greater narrowing of the criteria for relief, albeit without any necessary decrease in the volume or cost of postconviction litigation.
Rather than infusing habeas with new purpose, it would confirm
the most corrosive and pessimistic generalizations about the writ.
In comparison to this outcome, the two-track model employed at
present may indeed appear attractive.
B.

Two-Track Habeas and the Reform of Criminal-Justice
Institutions

Perhaps, though, habeas reform should not be isolated from
the larger context of criminal-justice administration. Notwithstanding its mention in the Constitution, habeas is not a good in
itself. It is an institutional feature that enables other valuable
human ends (in particular, individual liberty from unlawful or
unjust government confinement) to be realized. In concluding, I
develop the possibility that our unreformed two-track habeas can
play a role in stimulating reform in the criminal-justice institutions engendered by the usually punitive political economy of the
past half century. Perhaps, that is, it is not necessary to destroy
habeas in order to redeem it. Rather, it is desirable to think about

339

Id at 904. See also Blume, Johnson, and Weyble, 96 Cornell L Rev at 460 (cited in

note 9).
340

See text accompanying notes 182–93.
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how the exercise of habeas jurisdiction, even in the straitened
terms set out by the Roberts Court, fits into larger processes of
social and institutional change beyond the courts.
The role of habeas is not a direct one. Hoffmann and King are
surely correct that postconviction habeas is no panacea to criminal law institutions’ dysfunctionalities.341 Federal habeas is
largely irrelevant, for example, to systems of misdemeanor prosecutions that comprise more than three-quarters of state criminal-justice dockets.342 Yet federal courts evince little appetite for
institutional reform. Twice in recent years, the Court has confronted nonhabeas cases starkly presenting dysfunctionalities in
state criminal-justice institutions. Both times, the Court ducked
substantive judgments about the state’s conduct.
First, in Boyer v Louisiana,343 the Court confronted a challenge to Louisiana’s woefully underfunded indigent-defense funding system.344 Although formally a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial
case, Boyer’s certiorari petition presented an opportunity for the
Court to speak directly to the underlying funding crisis in indigent defense in the context of especially compelling facts. Instead,
the Court issued a per curiam opinion (over a sharp dissent from
Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) dismissing the
case on the basis of a factual finding sharply at odds with the
lower court’s conclusions.345 Then, in Connick v Thompson,346 the
same five-justice majority overturned a damages award against a
New Orleans prosecutor’s office that had withheld exculpatory evidence in capital proceedings.347 The Thompson ruling rejected the
341 See Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 810–14 (cited in note 7). But see Primus,
98 Cal L Rev at 32–33 (cited in note 5) (arguing that habeas should be reformed as a
structural remedy by requiring petitioners not just to show a discrete constitutional violation in their case, but also “evidence of a systemic violation of a constitutional right”).
342 Robert C. LaFountain, et al, Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of
2010 State Court Caseloads *24 (National Center for State Courts Dec 2012), online at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF
/CSP_DEC.ashx (visited May 21, 2014) (showing the breakdown of criminal-case type in
17 states). See also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S Cal L Rev 1313, 1316 (2012)
(identifying high rates of wrongful misdemeanor convictions).
343 133 S Ct 1702 (2013) (per curiam).
344 Id (Alito concurring). See also generally M. Isabel Medina, Reforming Criminal
Indigent Defense in Louisiana—An Introduction to the Symposium and a Brief Exploration
of Criminal Indigent Defense and Its Relationship to Immigrant Indigent Defense, 9 Loyola
J Pub Int L 111 (2008) (documenting problems in Louisiana’s indigent-defense system).
345 See Boyer, 133 S Ct at 1704, 1706 (Sotomayor dissenting) (noting that the Court
was acting inconsistently with the state court’s finding that most of the delay was caused
by the unavailability of funds for the defenses).
346 131 S Ct 1350 (2011).
347 See id at 1355–56.
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jury’s finding of municipal liability on the factual ground—
sharply contested by Justice Ginsburg in dissent—that the plaintiff had not shown a sufficient pattern of misconduct.348 Even in
the teeth of strong evidence of systemic breakdowns in criminal
justice, that is, the Court tends to blink even without the blinding
optics of habeas.
Perhaps, though, it is too much to ask courts to address institutional pathologies of the kind at work in Boyer head-on. Scholars have long rehearsed the limits of judicial reform capacity and
counseled for chastened expectations on that front.349 But there is
an alternative. Court decisions, for example, can still provide both
focal points and catalysts for larger processes of social and political movements. Supreme Court opinions, even if not effectual directly, can still generate “a political symbol that might assist others in the organizing, demanding, and resisting that is the stuff
of oppositional politics.”350 A nascent literature on the Supreme
Court’s national agenda-setting role finds that at least some opinions indeed have an enduring “step effect,” amplifying media attention on issues that would otherwise remain trapped in news
epicycles.351 In this indirect way, judicial rulings can open pathways to beneficial social change.
Habeas review arguably might still play a coordinating and a
catalyzing role in respect to the larger project of criminal-justice

348 Id at 1360. See also id at 1370–75 (Ginsburg dissenting). The Thompson Court’s
gimlet-eyed approach to evaluations of systemic constitutional violations suggests that
Primus’s proposal to raise the stakes of discrete habeas action by making each one systemic in scope is at least perilous. Rather than catalyzing reform, federal courts might be
unwilling to make politically contentious findings of systemic harm and therefore even
more inclined to deny habeas relief to individuals. For another 42 USC § 1983 case in
which the Court declined to explore the existence of a systemic failure, see Van de Kamp
v Goldstein, 129 S Ct 855, 861–62 (2009) (holding that prosecutors “involved in [ ] supervision or training or information-system management enjoy absolute immunity” from certain constitutional-tort claims).
349 For the leading works on this subject, see generally Michael J. Klarman, From Jim
Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford
2004); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
(Chicago 2d ed 2008).
350 Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal L Rev 673, 746 (1992).
351 Roy B. Flemming, John Bohte, and B. Dan Wood, One Voice among Many: The
Supreme Court’s Influence on Attentiveness to Issues in the United States, 1947–92, 41 Am
J Polit Sci 1224, 1234 (1997). See also Roy B. Flemming, B. Dan Wood, and John Bohte,
Attention to Issues in a System of Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of American Policy Agendas, 61 J Polit 76, 92 (1999).
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reform, even when it fails to supply individual relief.352 This possibility arises solely because of a sudden—and, to many observers,
unexpected—pivot in public and political sentiment regarding
crime and punishment. The pivot is evident both in terms of criminal-justice outcomes and in terms of observed policy.
To begin with, after many years of persistent increase, national incarceration rates have begun to stagnate. In 2009, for the
first time in three decades, the number of individuals under correctional supervision fell.353 Many states, including California,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Texas, and Virginia, have also
slowed or halted prison construction.354 The thirteen-fold increase
in state spending on incarceration between 1977 and 2004 no
longer seems as sustainable as it once did.355 Criminal laws are
also becoming less punitive. Two changes at the federal level can
serve as illustrations: In 2008, Congress enacted the Second
Chance Act, supporting state-level reentry and reintegration efforts.356 In 2010, it partially mitigated the disparity in sentencing
consequences between crack- and powder-cocaine crimes.357 In
2012, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that federal pros-

352 In their book, King and Hoffmann argue that habeas “helps to restore the balance
of powers on which our divided government rests,” using the Guantánamo detentions as a
case study. See King and Hoffmann, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century at 47 (cited in
note 7). Elsewhere, I have argued that this optimistic reading of Guantánamo-related habeas litigation is belied by the empirical evidence of case outcomes and detention rates.
See Huq, 26 Const Commen at 402–03 (cited in note 24). In addition the idea of “balance”
in constitutional design is beset by well-known and insuperable conceptual difficulties that
King and Hoffmann simply blink. See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 Cal L Rev 887, 929–44 (2012); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation
in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va L Rev 1127, 1155–57 (2000). The net result of their
analysis is a repudiation of a concrete liberty value universally recognized as central to
social welfare in favor of an alluring but ultimately inchoate, and perhaps even incoherent,
structural concept.
353 Pew Center on the States, Prison Count 2010 at *1 (cited in note 305).
354 See Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic Process
Shapes the Way America Punishes Offenders 6 (Oxford 2009).
355 See John F. Pfaff, The Durability of Prison Populations, 2010 U Chi Legal F 73,
76–77 (“States spent a total of $2.8 billion on corrections in 1977 and $39.3 billion in 2004;
this represents a thirteen-fold increase in nominal dollars and a four-and-half-fold increase in real dollars (although per-prisoner expenditures have actually declined slightly
in real terms).”).
356 Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub L No 110-199, 122 Stat 657 (2008).
357 See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub L No 111-220, 124 Stat 2372, 2372, codified
at 21 USC § 841(b)(1) (reducing the disparity between crack- and powder-cocaine penalties
from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1).
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ecutors would no longer list quantities of illegal narcotics in indictments for certain low-level drug cases, a move that would
sidestep the triggering of long mandatory-minimum sentences.358
Quite what caused this unexpected ebbing of the undertow in
American punitiveness is currently hard to discern with certainty. Crack-related violence is less salient than it once was.
States and localities are under growing fiscal pressures due to the
2008 financial crisis and crystallizing concerns about incipient
pension liabilities. Perhaps a certain style of politics that fed on
crime-related fears has become less palatable.359 Regardless of its
causes, at least one of its consequences is clear: the Supreme
Court’s typically punitive attitude to crime and criminals now
seems sharply out of step with contemporary political pressures.
justices appointed by presidents who made crime control a central
talking point360 are no longer vocalizing a wider political zeitgeist.
In this new context, the Court’s occasional interventions on
behalf of habeas petitioners may stand a chance of catalyzing or
sustaining a larger shift away from a costly, punitive approach to
criminal justice, in favor of a more tempered modality in which
convictions and sentences are not pursued at any and all cost. No
doubt the justices will never play a sole leadership role in this
effort. But it has long been understood that the Court can and
does play a tutelary role in national public debates.361 Habeas—
by drawing attention in a dramatic and specific fashion to particular pathologies in the criminal-justice system—may be an im-

358 Eric Holder, Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Remarks at the Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Department of Justice Aug 12, 2013),
online at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html (visited
May 21, 2014).
359 One leading study attributes American punitiveness to “the belief that those disproportionately subject to [ ] harsh sanctions are people they do not like: African American
offenders.” James D. Unnever and Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources of Americans’
Punitiveness: A Test of Three Competing Models, 48 Criminol 99, 119 (2010). Whether this
race-oriented thinking has shifted of late—perhaps with installation of an African American in the White House—is a large and difficult question that lies far beyond my remit
here.
360 For President Richard Nixon, see Annual Message to the Congress on the State of
the Union, 1970 Pub Papers 8, 12 (declaring a war on crime). For Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George H.W. Bush, see Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U
Chi Legal F 25, 70. It would be misleading to suggest that Democratic presidents have not
shared this rhetoric. See William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 20 U Dayton L Rev 567, 568 (1995) (signing a
harsh crime bill and remarking that “[t]here must be no doubt about whose side we’re on”).
361 This has been so since the early days of the Republic. See Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 S Ct Rev 127, 177–80.
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portant element of this judicial role. And the fault-based framework of two-track habeas arguably channels judicial attention toward a subset of cases most likely to have the largest long-term
public impact. Indeed, given the sheer volume of habeas petitions,
neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts would be
able to play this role at all without the triaging provided by the
two-track model.
The sheer volume of postconviction-litigation may, in addition, influences policy outcomes. Habeas thus matters to any
larger project of criminal-justice reform not only because the
sheer cost of habeas litigation likely has a frictional effect on the
punitiveness of state criminal law.362 The resources now devoted
by the state to defending its convictions are resources that would
otherwise be deployed in the creation of new convictions.
Even in these early days of the Roberts Court’s bifurcated approach to habeas, there is some evidence that the Court is able
and willing to play a supporting role in the larger project of criminal-justice reform. Three recent examples from cases on both
Track One and Track Two serve to demonstrate the point.
The first is the unanticipated spate of Track Two cases from
Martinez and Maples to Trevino that have underscored the architectonic role that effective assistance of counsel might be thought
to play in a well-tempered criminal-justice system. Even if courts
resist frontal confrontation with the underfinanced realities of indigent defense in Boyer and serial prosecutorial misconduct in
Connick, they are nonetheless capable of indirectly narrating
compelling stories of how failures of counsel compromise broadly
shared criminal-justice goals. Hence, in Maples v Thomas, Justice
Ginsburg strategically situated the attorney error in that case in
the larger context of Alabama’s systemic failure to provide effective counsel in capital cases.363 Although Ginsburg did not belabor
the point, it was clear from her opinion that the breakdown in
Maples’s case ought not to be ranked as a surprise. The implications for larger reform are clear for those willing to see.364 Given
the Court’s high profile in national affairs, such cases provide opportunities for advocates of criminal-justice reform to press their

362 See Louis Michael Seidman, Review, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of
Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 Yale L J 2281, 2314 (1998).
363 See Maples, 132 S Ct at 917–18.
364 See Carol S. Steiker, Raising the Bar: Maples v. Thomas and the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel, 127 Harv L Rev 468, 470–71 (2013) (developing the larger implications
of the Maples opinion).
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case in the teeth of a spasmodic and sensation-filled news cycle.
Opinions like Justice Ginsburg’s provide a legitimating platform
for advocates and legislators seeking to erode punitive and niggardly approaches to criminal justice and indigent defense.
A second example concerns the Court’s role in national debates about capital punishment. Even aside from its elaboration
of new constitutional rules, interventions via habeas provide a focal point for debate and mobilization on the death penalty.365
What might otherwise be a local event of interest solely to singleissue activists becomes national news through the operation of
federal habeas. The Court’s intervention to stay briefly the execution of Troy Davis by the state of Georgia in 2011, for example,
though ultimately unavailing,366 generated a national and even
international debate.367 No doubt capital cases would generate
some attention even in the absence of habeas review,368 but the
Court’s participation via postconviction habeas underscores the
high moral stakes in play and also legitimatize wider condemnations (and, equally, defenses) of what otherwise might be a local
sensation.
On the other hand, there is a powerful potential counterargument to this point: it is also possible that concerns about capital
punishment have come to pollute pervasively the justices’ thinking about habeas, edging to the margins other serious worries
about more mundane noncapital criminal-justice systems. This
elision arguably blinds the Court to the real stakes of habeas litigation and distorts its analysis by filtering it through the emotive
and polarizing lens of debates on the death penalty.369 Far better
to detach habeas from the related, but conceptually distinct, question of capital punishment—as I have aimed to do here.

365 See Timothy R. Johnson and Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 Am Polit Sci Rev 299, 304–07 (1998) (analyzing
capital punishment cases, and finding that the Court’s influence on public opinion is greatest the first time the Court rules on an issue).
366 The Court exercised its original jurisdiction to remand Davis’s petition for an evidentiary hearing. See In re Davis, 130 S Ct 1, 1 (2009). The district court and Eleventh
Circuit ultimately denied relief. See Davis v Terry, 625 F3d 716, 719 (11th Cir 2010). Davis
was executed on September 22, 2011.
367 See, for example, John Schwartz, In the Debate on Capital Punishment, Davis Execution Offers Little Closure, NY Times A17 (Sept 23, 2011); Scott Sayare, In Europe, a
Chorus of Outrage over a U.S. Execution, NY Times A13 (Sept 23, 2011).
368 See David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 294–95 (Belknap 2010).
369 This might suggest that the project of larger criminal-justice reform is best pursued when decoupled from debates about the death penalty.
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Finally, sometimes individual cases can present facts so
striking their public resonance is unmistakable. In 2011 the
Court issued one of its serial per curiam reversals of the Ninth
Circuit’s grants of habeas relief in a case involving a grandmother
called Shirley Ree Smith. Smith was convicted in relation to her
grandchild’s death from “shaken baby” syndrome.370 Smith’s
case—and the prospect of a clearly traumatized grandmother being punished for the death of a grandchild when her guilt was, to
say the least, under a cloud—occasioned national attention,
which in turn elicited a rare exercise of gubernatorial clemency
by Jerry Brown.371 Smith’s habeas petition may not have been directly successful, but it again turned a local issue into a national
one—and arguably catalyzed relief through a political mechanism
that has until recently been largely moribund.372 It also shows
how even a denial of habeas relief can lead to localized reform. In
all of these cases, habeas at least presented a possible platform
for social and political mobilization, even if the ensuing opportunities have been taken up in only a patchwork and unsatisfying
fashion.
To many, all this may seem the squeezing of sour lemonade
from withered lemons. It is very clear, after all, that the role of
habeas in any movement to transform criminal justice writ large
will be liminal rather than central. Others, however, may reflect
that the palette of instruments available to reformers of the criminal-justice system is not a large one to begin with, so that reformers must seize on even the thinnest of wedges. Habeas has the
advantage of a long history and a constitutional pedigree. Although I have criticized the fault-based standard, I have not ruled
out the possibility that fault will prove a sufficiently plastic notion
that it might allow the Court to play a more aggressive role in
policing criminal-justice administration over time. Reformers
may also note that habeas allows bottom-up percolation of problems in state criminal-justice institutions. In cases like Holland
and Maples, it ventriloquizes the most disdained and least politically powerful among us. For all its flaws, postconviction review
370

Cavazos v Smith, 132 S Ct 2, 6–8 (2011).
See Emily Bazelon, Jerry Brown Shows Mercy to Shirley Ree Smith: The Governor
Does the Right Thing in a Doubly Tragic Shaken Baby Case, Slate (Apr 6, 2012), online at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2012/04/jerry_brown_pardons
_shirley_ree_smith_in_an_old_sad_shaken_baby_case_.html (visited May 21, 2014).
372 See Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and
Its Structure, 89 Va L Rev 239, 251 (2003) (noting the decline in and infrequent use of
clemency from 1973 to 1999).
371
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is thus a political rarity insofar as it allows prisoners and their
counsel to set an agenda on a national scale. Such review thereby
can provide a vehicle for perceived local injustice to reach and linger before national audiences. The value of such symbols and platforms for organizing is hard to predict and may not be obvious
contemporaneously.
To many, it will seem obvious that the benefits flowing from
a handful of Supreme Court cases do not warrant the costs involved in lower courts’ daily adjudications.373 Simple cost-benefit
analysis is difficult without complex comparative judgments
across different political toolkits, and recalcitrant predictive judgments about the pathways of institutional change.374 By keeping
questions such as capital punishment and our ongoing indigentdefense crisis in the public eye, it may nevertheless be that habeas yields sufficient offsetting benefits within the larger project
of criminal-justice reform to justify its marginal costs for federal
courts and state prosecutors.
CONCLUSION
Scholars have fallen out of love with habeas. Yet the Supreme
Court still consumes a regular diet of postconviction cases. A consequence of academic disfavor has been that the Roberts Court’s
large body of habeas jurisprudence has gone unexamined. Instead, scholars have leapt to the conclusion that doctrine is a mere
“charade” unworthy of attention. That assumption is untenable
and should be abandoned.
The central descriptive aim of this Article has been to demonstrate the surprising internal coherence of the Roberts Court’s
postconviction doctrine. Bifurcated into two distinct tracks, that
structure operates as a mechanism for titrating both the quality
of scrutiny petitions receive and for rationing the thimbles of habeas relief now granted. My second goal has been to analyze potential justifications for this two-track model of habeas. Rejecting
functionalist explanations predicated on selection effects or feedback mechanisms, I have posited fault as an organizing lodestar
that has been borrowed from the constitutional-tort context. To
many, this will seem an unappealing, and even irrelevant, central
373 Although I am skeptical that the marginal fiscal cost of habeas is large. See text
accompanying notes 336–37.
374 See Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 Ann
Rev Polit Sci 369, 383 (1999) (describing studies that show how symbolic policies subsequently catalyze substantive shifts in policy).
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value. My aim here is not to defend per se the role of fault, but
simply to suggest that it has provided the justices with a needful
tool for reconciling competing demands of institutional capacity
and equity. A deeper understanding of the doctrinal architecture
also helps illuminate the extant critiques of postconviction review
and points the way toward a better conceptualization of the writ’s
role in efforts to reform our dysfunctional criminal-justice systems.
And so, like Banquo’s ghost lingering at Macbeth’s banquet,375
postconviction habeas is an insistent reminder of unfinished business. In my judgment, it will not do simply to wash one’s hands of
that responsibility by pretending that our criminal-justice system
is in sound working order. Nor it is appropriate to resile to the
fiction that the national political process stands in good repair
and hence will eventually supply a full measure of responsive
change. These are illusions best dispelled in short order. On the
other hand, I suspect that habeas will prove as recalcitrant, as
obdurate, as Banquo’s specter given the continuing absence of any
plausible alternative mechanism for rationing judicial labor.
Hard to banish, postconviction habeas in all its somewhat baroque and bloody glory warrants continued attention, and not the
disdain that to date it has received.

375

See William Shakespeare, Macbeth Act III, Scene IV (American Book 1904).

